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ABSTRACT
DAVID J. JONES: Essays on Preventive Care and Children’s Health
(Under the direction of Donna B. Gilleskie)
In light of concerns over rising health care expenditures in the U.S., the need to develop
low-cost methods of reducing health risks is more pressing than ever before. In many
cases, effective preventive care can reduce the need for more expensive curative care later
in life. If preventive care can be a sufficiently useful substitute for curative care and a
sufficiently cost-effective one, a shift towards this type of behavior could greatly benefit
society. While preventive care may be beneficial at all ages, the greatest potential individual
and societal benefits may be found in young children during crucial stages of development.
It is also reasonable to assume that subsections of the population, for instance those of
a lower socioeconomic status and the uninsured, will benefit more from preventive care.
Unfortunately, we lack a thorough understanding of the connection between preventive care
and reduced health risks. It has proven difficult to establish causal links between preventive
behaviors and illnesses later in life. There is also a dearth of evidence concerning factors
that impact consumption of preventive care, such as health insurance status. My thesis
is composed of two essays that contribute to the understanding of the potential health
implications and benefits of preventive care and factors that affect the demand for preventive
care in the U.S.
In the first essay, I investigate the impact of treatment of lead-based paint hazards in
housing units (the preventive action) on childhood lead poisoning (the health outcome) at
the census tract level in Chicago, in order to gain a better understanding of the effects
of an investment in primary prevention on health. I use the findings from the analysis
to simulate and then weigh the costs of lead interventions against the potential benefits
of reducing blood lead levels in children. Childhood lead poisoning presents a particularly
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useful example of the efficacy of preventive care in reducing the incidence of a disease. There
is a clear, well-defined pathway of exposure (deteriorating lead paint in older homes) and no
method of secondary care that effectively mitigates the negative health effects. I find that
a one-tenth percentage point increase in the proportion of older housing units that have
been remediated is associated with a five to six-tenths percentage point reduction in the
incidence of childhood lead poisoning. Citywide, this is roughly 1.75 cases of lead poisoning
averted for every housing unit remediated. Furthermore, I find evidence that the effect of
remediations in preventing the disease has improved over time. The lower bound estimates
of the benefits associated with the reduction in lead poisoning - increased expected lifetime
earnings and reduced medical expenditures - is two to ten times the estimated costs of the
remediations.
In the second essay, I estimate the impact of expansions of two public health insurance
programs, Medicaid and the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), on the
utilization of preventive care among children. Health insurance provides various incentives
for individuals to alter their medical care utilization. A host of studies have established
a positive association between increased eligibility for public health insurance and medi-
cal care utilization of children, but few focus on medical preventive care. This essay is a
comprehensive examination of the causal relationship between the increased eligibility for
Medicaid and SCHIP over a seven year period from 1997 to 2003 and consumption of well-
child care and immunizations. I explore the differential impacts of eligibility across various
subpopulations such as parental education, country of origin, and race to investigate how
different groups react to the incentives provided by public health insurance. I use variation
in the income cutoffs for Medicaid and SCHIP across states, time, and age groups to identify
the effect of eligibility for public health insurance. I find that eligibility for public health
insurance is associated with a 14 percentage point increase in the likelihood of consuming
preventive physician visits and a two percentage point increase in the probability of having
a usual source of care. Regarding immunizations, the evidence suggests that, in general,
the incentives provided by eligibility are not enough to induce families to increase utiliza-
tion. Hispanic children and those born outside of the U.S. do not increase utilization when
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made eligible to the extent of their counterparts. Black children and those neither black or
white take greater advantage of eligibility in establishing a usual source of preventive care.
Conversely, the likelihood of having a physician’s office as a usual source of preventive care
increased more among white children.
v
To Mom, Dad, Jenn and Kim.
vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am indebted to family, friends, colleagues and my dissertation comittee for their
generous support during my graduate studies. I would like to thank Donna Gilleskie for
her guidance and wisdom. I would also like to thank John Akin, Michael Foster, Edward
Norton, and Sally Stearns for their thoughtful comments and edits. I am grateful to the
Chicago Department of Public Health and those working with the National Health
Immunization Survey for the data provided in the essays.
This work would not have been possible without the love and support of family and
friends. Thank you Jess, Albert, and Brian for your friendship and encouragement. I am
also grateful to my sisters Jenn and Kim for the strong examples they continue to set as
well as countless laughs over the past few years. I would like to impart a special thank you
to my parents, David and Kathleen Jones, for their unending love and support and the
example of hard work and integrity that they so clearly set. I hope to apply what I have
learned in my studies to my work in an attempt to live up to this example.
vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xii
Chapter
1 Primary Prevention and Health Outcomes:
Treatment of Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazards and
the Incidence of Childhood Lead Poisoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2.1 Exposure Pathways and Health Effects in Children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
1.2.2 Lead Inspections and Abatements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2.3 Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
1.3.1 Data Source and Study Population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3.2 Measurement of Key Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
1.4 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.4.1 Conceptual Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.4.2 Panel Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.6 Cost-Benefit Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.6.1 Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.6.2 Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24
1.6.3 Benefits Versus Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2 The Impact of Public Health Insurance Eligibility on
Preventive Care Utilization Among Children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40
viii
2.2.1 Medicaid Expansion and the Creation of SCHIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.2.2 Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.3 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45
2.3.1 Conceptual Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.4 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49
2.4.1 Data Source and Study Population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.4.2 Measurement of Key Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51
2.5 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
A Appendix for Chapter Two . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75
A.1 CDC recommended immunization schedule for children aged 0-6 years . . . 76
A.2 Summary Means - dependent variables - immunizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
A.3 Summary Means - explanatory variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
A.4 Summary Means - Health insurance coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
A.5 Summary Means - dependent variables - preventive physician visits . . . . . . 80
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
ix
LIST OF TABLES
1.1 Glossary of key terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.2 Summary Means by Year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.3 Mean %EBLs by the dependent, abatement, and control variables . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.4 Results from Model 1 - OLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.5 Results from Model 2 - Census Tract Fixed Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.6 Results from Model 3 - Census Tract Fixed Effects with
Alternate Remediation Variable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.7 Summary of BLL and IQ loss literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34
1.8 Benefits and costs associated with a one-tenth increase
in the remediation variable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.1 Dependent variables (immunization means), by eligibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.2 Dependent variables (immunization means), by enrollment
(Medicaid or SCHIP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.3 Explanatory variables, by source of immunization data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.4 Dependent variables (preventive physician visit means),
by eligibility and enrollment (Medicaid or SCHIP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
2.5 Subset of dependent variables, by selected explanatory variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.6 Percentage with a checkup in the last 12 months, by
selected explanatory variables and eligibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .68
2.7 Coefficients for impact of public insurance on preventive
physician visits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .69
2.8 Cofficients for impact of public insurance on immunizations
(reported on health card) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2.9 Cofficients for impact of public insurance on immunizations
(reported by parent) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
2.10 Signs of coefficients for covariates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .72
2.11 Cofficients on covariates interacted with eligibility for
whether child has had a routine physician visit in past
12 months as dependent variable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
2.12 Coefficients on covariates interacted with eligibility for
whether child has a usual source of preventive care as
x
dependent variable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
xi
LIST OF FIGURES
1.1 Benefit Pathway from Increased Remediation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
xii
Chapter 1
Primary Prevention and Health
Outcomes: Treatment of Residential
Lead-Based Paint Hazards and the
Incidence of Childhood Lead Poisoning
1.1 Introduction
Childhood lead poisoning is the second most prevalent preventable disease in children1
in the United States (CDC, 2005). In general, the average blood lead level (BLL) in children
has been declining over the last three decades, down 90% since 1978 (EPA, 2005). However,
levels among low-income, urban children, particularly those living in older housing, remain
high (CDPH, 2004). Furthermore, recent medical studies of the effects of lead poisoning on
cognitive ability in children have demonstrated negative impacts at levels previously thought
to be below the threshold for concern (Koller et al., 2004).
There are many factors that have contributed to the decline in the prevalence of lead
poisoning over the past few decades, foremost of which are the phaseout of leaded gasoline
beginning in the early 1970’s and a greater awareness of the disease. Currently, the greatest
source of lead exposure in children is deteriorating lead-based paint in old, poorly-maintained
1Asthma is the most prevalent.
housing. Thus, future reductions in the incidence of the disease in children will come from
the treatment of lead paint hazards in the home.
The primary goal of this paper is to investigate the role that the treatment of lead-based
paint in homes has played in the declining rate of childhood lead poisoning in the U.S.
More specifically, I intend to estimate the impact of an investment in lead remediations, a
non-medical approach to primary prevention, on the incidence of elevated blood lead levels
(EBLs) in Chicago, Illinois. Using these findings, I also provide evidence that the benefits to
society from remediations and the resulting reduced lead exposure in children far outweigh
the costs of the necessary lead hazard treatments.
Rather than measure whether individual remediations prevent cases of lead poisoning,
I investigate whether the aggregate remediation efforts in a given area (U.S. census tracts)
will reduce the incidence of childhood lead poisoning there. I use the number of housing
units remediated in several different ways to reflect the “health of the housing stock” in an
area over time (i.e. the degree to which the housing stock is free of lead hazards). As the
investment in prevention increases and the health of the housing stock improves, children
face a lower risk of exposure to lead and the incidence of lead poisoning should decline.
There are several aspects of childhood lead poisoning and its prevention that provide
a useful case for studying preventive care and its impacts on health. First, there is a
clear pathway with a short time horizon from exposure to illness in children (lead-based
paint hazards in older, poorly-maintained housing units). Thus, it is possible to isolate the
effect of prevention on a health outcome from other confounding factors. In addition, the
devastating health effects of lead are irreversible. The only effective way to combat the
illness is to prevent it from occurring. Lastly the potential benefits of prevention are rather
large compared to the costs of increased remediation.
Chicago is an ideal location for the study because it has one of the highest rates of
childhood lead poisoning as well as one of the most active lead prevention programs in the
nation. Chicago has more total cases of lead poisoning in children per year than any other
U.S. city (CDPH, 2004).
I observe each variable by year from 1997 to 2003 and by census tract. I begin by esti-
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mating a simple linear model of the incidence of childhood lead poisoning. The panel dataset
also allows me to include year dummy variables to account for aggregate unobserved factors
that drive down EBLs homogeneously across tracts over time. There are potential sources of
unobserved heterogeneity that differentially impact the incidence of EBLs in census tracts
(i.e. there are “problem tracts” that have high levels of EBLs and lead remediation in
homes). If this is the case, OLS estimates of the effect of remediations on EBLs will be
biased, leading to a spurious positive relationship between remediation and lead poisoning.
Alternatively, I estimate fixed effects models to account for any unobserved census tract
impacts. Reverse causality between the remediation variable and the dependent variable
(i.e. a fraction of remediations are ordered in homes because children living there have
tested positive for lead poisoning) is another potential problem. Again, OLS estimates will
be biased upwards toward zero. To account for the endogeneity of the remediation variables,
I investigate different ways to calculate the variable that will purge any reverse causality.
Once I account for census tract fixed effects, a one-tenth percentage point increase in
the percentage of housing units remediated (a reasonable increase given the annual changes
observed in the data) is associated with a five to six-tenths decrease in the incidence of
childhood lead poisoning. Citywide, from 1997 to 2003, this effect translates to 1.75 cases
averted for each additional housing unit treated. Furthermore, the negative impact of re-
mediations on EBLs strengthens over time. I also find that there was a sharp decline in the
incidence of EBLs from 1997 to 2003 not captured by remediations or any of the control
variables. This is evidenced by the strong, negative and consistently increasing coefficients
on the time dummy variables, most likely accounting for the reduction in lead from gasoline
and increased awareness.
When controlling for various housing and sociodemographic characteristics in the panel
analysis, the proportion of the population that is black race, a significant risk factor in
other studies, is no longer an important predictor of lead poisoning in children. I also
provide evidence that certain risk factors have declined in importance over time, however,
not because of increased remediations. It appears that unobserved factors such as increased
awareness have had a differential impact over time on various subpopulations.
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The increase in lifetime earnings and the reduced medical care expenditures from a one-
tenth percentage point increase in remediation are far greater than the corresponding costs.
The lower bound estimate of the benefit-cost ratio is 2:1 while the upper bound is roughly
10:1. The largest dollar benefit by far is the increase in the discounted net present value of
expected lifetime earnings from an increase in cognitive ability in children (measured as an
increase in IQ). The upper bound estimates are reasonable for Chicago given the findings
in other studies of nationwide benefits of reductions in mean BLLs.
1.2 Background
1.2.1 Exposure Pathways and Health Effects in Children
The two greatest sources of lead (by volume) released into the environment over the past
century have been lead-based paint and leaded gasoline. They are responsible for nearly
equal shares of the lead burden in the U.S., measured as millions of metric tons each (Mielke
and Reagan, 1998). Lead was used as an additive in almost all industrial and residential
paints, primarily to increase durability and improve appearance. It was used as an additive
in gasoline to increase octane levels.
Lead was blended with gasoline for the majority of the 20th century. It was first added
to gasoline in the U.S. in the 1920’s. The usage peaked in the early 1970’s at over 2 million
metric tons per year (Mielke and Reagan, 1998). However, due to the growing realization
in the 1970’s of the health effects of lead along with the inclusion of the catalytic converter
to almost all vehicles sold in the U.S., the use of lead in gasoline began to decline.2 The
official phaseout began in 1973 and culminated on January 1, 1996, when the sale of leaded
gasoline was banned in the U.S. as part of the Clean Air Act.
Lead was commonly used as an additive in residential paint in the U.S. from the late 19th
century until 1978. Lead paint manufacturers voluntarily reduced the lead content of paint
throughout the 1950’s, although the levels were still high enough to produce a significant
2Leaded gasoline is not compatible with catalytic converters, which were added to automobiles sold in
the U.S. in the 1970’s to reduce air pollution.
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risk of exposure (ATSDR, 1988). Paint manufactured prior to 1950 can contain up to 50%
lead by weight (Reissman et al., 2001). In June 1977, the U.S. Consumer Product Safety
Commission reduced the legal level of lead in paint to 0.06% by dry solid, effectively banning
the practice altogether. Although the ban covered the manufacturing of lead paint, it did
not have an impact on existing paint in homes (Mushak and Crocetti, 1990).
Besides paint and gasoline, cultural sources of lead exposure that tend to originate
outside the U.S. include pottery, cosmetics, and folk remedies brought to the U.S. from
Mexico, Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Middle East (Trotter, 1990; Parry and Eaton,
1991; Shannon 1998). Although these sources can lead to extreme cases of lead poisoning
in children (Parry and Eaton, 1991; Shannon, 1998), they present a much smaller source of
exposure (both in volume of lead and in the number of children exposed) than paint and
gasoline.
While leaded gasoline has been an important source of lead exposure in the U.S., lead
found in deteriorating residential paint is currently the greatest source of lead exposure to
children (CDC, 1997; Shannon and Graef, 1992; Lanphear et al., 1998; Jacobs et al., 2002;
Koller et al., 2004). Prior to the ban in 1978, almost all household interior and exterior
paint contained lead. Thus, the overwhelming majority of housing units built before 1978
contain some amount of lead paint. If the paint surfaces are not maintained in homes, it is
common for those living there to be exposed to lead contaminated paint chips, dust, and
soil. In 2002, an estimated 38 million housing units in the U.S. contained lead-based paint,
of which 24 million had lead hazards, defined as deteriorated paint, dust lead, or bare soil
(Jacobs et al., 2002).
Several studies found evidence that lead dust is the primary pathway of exposure among
lead paint sources (Jacobs et al., 2002; Koller et al., 2004). Evidence also suggests that lead
from deteriorating lead-based paint contributes more lead to contaminated soil than any
other source (Lanphear and Roghmann, 1997; Jacobs et al., 2002; Brown and Jacobs, 2006).
Thus, even though a large amount of fine lead dust was deposited in the environment during
the widespread use of leaded gasoline, lead from paint poses the greatest current threat of
lead exposure to children.
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Children are at a greater risk of exposure to lead in paint than adults for several reasons.
Infants are especially susceptible to lead contaminated floor dust from deteriorating paint,
as young children tend to exhibit high levels of hand to mouth activity (CDC, 1997; Koller
et al., 2004). Slightly older children also face an elevated risk of exposure to lead, although
from lead-based paint chips and dust, mainly found around windowsills. In addition, lead
gives paint a sweet taste that increases the likelihood that children will ingest the lead based
paint (LSH, 2005).
The negative effects of lead are particularly damaging to young children. First, children
absorb and retain more lead than adults (Ziegler et al., 1978; McCabe, 1979; Koller et al.,
2004). The lead is stored in bones and soft tissue and may later remobilize into the blood
stream (Shannon and Graef, 1992). Furthermore, at this age, the neurological development
of children is particularly susceptible to the negative influences of lead (McCabe, 1979; Koller
et al., 2004; Goldstein, 1990). A well-developed literature argues that these neurological
impacts reduce cognitive ability and lead to behavioral problems and learning disabilities
later in life. Exposure to lead can also lead to kidney failure, damage of the central nervous
system, and even death in cases of extremely high exposure.
Once a child is lead poisoned, there is little that medical intervention can do to reverse
the detrimental effects lead causes in the human body. Children who have been severely
poisoned generally undergo chelation therapy, a procedure that helps remove some of the lead
from the body and reduce blood lead levels. Although removing lead from the bloodstream
can help minimize potential future health effects and declines in cognitive ability, it cannot
reverse the damage already done from lead exposure (Rogan et al., 2001). While lead has
only a two week half life in the blood, it has roughly a two year half life in the brain (Lidsky
and Schnedier, 2003). Furthermore, chelation is only effective in reducing BLLs in the long-
run when provided in conjunction with remediations (Shannon, 1998; Chisolm Jr., 1990). If
the sources of exposure are not addressed, then children moving back into the housing units
will be reintroduced to the original hazards and BLLs will likely rebound.
The most effective way to combat lead poisoning is to prevent it from occurring. Thus,
those involved in childhood lead poisoning prevention have focused their efforts on eliminat-
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ing the major source of exposure (i.e., lead-based paint in older poorly-maintained housing).
1.2.2 Lead Inspections and Abatements
There are three different classes of lead inspection. The most comprehensive type of
inspection is the “lead inspection” during which all painted surfaces inside and outside of
the home are sampled and tested. In a “risk assessment”, an inspector will locate and test
any damaged paint surfaces, dust on floors and windows, surfaces licked or chewed on by
children, and soil. A “lead hazard screen” is a limited version of the risk assessment. An
inspector will determine which type of inspection is appropriate for a housing unit based on
a visual inspection. For the purposes of this paper, I will refer to any type of environmental
screen as an inspection. Refer to Table 1.1 for definitions of key terms.
In Chicago, a housing unit can be inspected for three reasons: 1) if the unit was built
before 1978 and receives federal funding, e.g. Federal Housing Authority and Section 8
housing, 2) if a child under six years of age living in the unit has tested positive for blood
lead poisoning, or 3) if the housing unit has violated a city housing code.
In all three of the cases listed above, if a lead hazard is identified, the hazard must be
addressed with mitigation or an abatement. According to state law, a hazard is sufficiently
mitigated if “the area no longer produces a hazardous level of leaded chips, flakes, dust, or
any other form of lead substance” (IDPH, 1992). The definition of abatement, a stricter
standard, requires that all lead-based paint surfaces be removed or covered such that there
is no threat of lead exposure for at least twenty years. In Chicago, lead inspectors are by
law allowed to force property owners to either mitigate or abate, depending on the severity,
any lead hazards identified in an inspection. For the purposes of this paper, all mitigations
and abatements will be referred to as lead remediations (Table 1.1).
1.2.3 Related Literature
This analysis is the first to measure the large scale effects of investment in prevention
on the incidence of childhood lead poisoning. In an aggregate level study by Bailey et al.
(1998), the authors found that after controlling for a host of proven risk factors, census
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tracts in a county with a history of remediation activity had lower rates of childhood lead
poisoning than tracts in a similar county with no such history. The study did not have
any inspection or remediation data and did not attempt to measure the specific impact of
remediations on the incidence of childhood lead poisoning.
The majority of studies that examine the impact of lead hazard control have focused
on the efficacy of individual remediations in preventing future EBLs in children currently
living there. The purpose of the studies is to determine whether a remediation could actually
increase exposure rather than result in the intended reduction in exposure. They do not
examine the population effects of large scale remediation efforts. The literature has shown
that when done according to the current EPA guidelines which include the control of lead
dust, addressing lead-based paint hazards in a unit can effectively reduce the blood lead
levels of children living there (Charney et al., 1983; Farfel et al., 1994; Galke et al., 2001).
There are studies that have found contradictory evidence that children’s blood lead levels
increase when they are reintroduced to remediated housing units (Chisolm, 1990; Rey-
Alvarez and Menke-Hargrave, 1987; Shannon and Graef, 1992). However, each of these
studies noted that this was not the case when the remediations were done correctly and in
particular, when lead dust was addressed. Furthermore, all of these studies were performed
prior the passage of the EPA’s lead safe work practices, which stress the importance of lead
contaminated dust (EPA, 1992).
A large body of work has been devoted to understanding the various risk factors associ-
ated with childhood lead poisoning. While these studies do not test the impact of remedi-
ations, they help identify primary exposure pathways and sensitive populations, which are
crucial in constructing models of childhood lead poisoning. As previously discussed, the
hypothesized primary exposure pathway among children is deteriorating lead-based paint in
older housing units. The risk factor literature supports this claim. Numerous studies have
found that the age of housing, particularly housing built before 1950, is an especially strong
predictor of EBLs (Pirkle et al., 1998; Reissman et al., 2001; Sargent et al., 1995; Sargent
et al., 1997). Furthermore, variables that might proxy for the condition of housing, such
as renter versus owner occupancy and vacant housing have proven to be positively corre-
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lated with childhood lead poisoning (Reissman et al., 2001; Sargent et al., 1995; Sargent
et al., 1997). Other risk factors for lead poisoning include black race, Hispanic origin, and
income, which remain significant across all ages of housing (Crocetti et al., 1990; Melman
at al., 1998; Pirkle et al., 1998). Gender and urban setting are not significant predictors of
EBLs once the aforementioned risk factors are considered (Melman et al., 1998; Pirkle et
al., 1998).
Recent literature has focused on the reduced cognitive ability in children exposed to what
were previously considered low levels of exposure. The literature suggests that rather serious
declines occur in cognitive ability, generally measured as a reduction in IQ points, among
children exposed to levels under the current definition of lead poisoning (Koller et al., 2004).
Several studies raise questions relating to the methods of the former group of analyses and
urge caution in interpreting the seriousness of the demonstrated reduction in IQ (Kaufman,
2001A; Kaufman, 2001B; Hebben, 2001). I provide a more in depth discussion of this debate
and the estimated reductions of IQ from lead exposure at the end of this paper.
1.3 Data
1.3.1 Data Source and Study Population
The Chicago Department of Public Health (CDPH) provided the total number of lead
screens and positive cases3 for children under six years of age by census tract and year for
1997 through 2003. Given that individual blood lead data are confidential, the aggregation
must be done in such a way that individual data cannot be “backed out” of the statistics. To
maintain the confidentiality of the individuals in the dataset, any incidence statistic calcu-
lated with less than five children (an arbitrary cutoff set by the CDPH) in the denominator
must be suppressed. For instance, if, in a given geographical unit, less than five children
are screened for lead poisoning, reporting the percentage of those that tested positive could
jeopardize the confidentiality of those individual results. The largest number of census tracts
3The current CDC definition of childhood lead poisoning is a screen above 10 µg/dL.
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suppressed in any given year is 45 out of the 866 census tracts in Chicago blood lead data.4
The CDPH provided their environmental data files, which contain inspection, violation,
and remediation data for every address inspected for lead in Chicago.5 Unlike the blood
lead data, the results of individual lead inspections are available to the public. Furthermore,
lead inspections are not necessarily tied to positive blood lead results in children and thus,
releasing inspection data at the housing unit level does not compromise the confidentiality
of medical records.
For every address inspected in Chicago, the database contains whether a violation oc-
curred and a subsequent remediation if necessary. For inspections performed between 1997
and 2003, the data contain violation status, whether the violation has been addressed and
the date of remediation.
The control variables were taken from the 1990 and 2000 U.S. Censuses. The census
variables are reported for each census tract in Chicago for these two years. Chicago was
divided into 876 census tracts in 1990 and 2000. The number of demolitions of residen-
tial buildings in Chicago was provided by the Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning
(CMAP).
The blood lead and inspections files contain information from 866 and 785 census tracts,
respectively.6 I received data for seven years, 1997 through 2003, for each census tract,
for a total of 6,069 tract/year observations. The inspection data contains information on
3,465 tract/year combinations. Tracts with no housing data are assumed to have had no
inspections or remediations in that year. The final sample contains blood lead, inspection,
and census data by census tract and year for 866 tracts over 7 years. Since the census is
performed only once per decade, I do not have yearly data for census variables. I will discuss
ways in which I deal with this obstacle in the next section of this chapter.
4Census tracts with less than five screens tend to have zero or very few children under six years of age
living there. The average number of children less than six years of age in census tracts in which blood lead
data are suppressed is 14 compared to 315 for all other tracts.
5The file was first cleaned by Abt Associates in Cambridge Massachusetts as part of another project.
6Although, as noted previously, some tract/year observations are suppressed due to confidentiality con-
cerns.
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1.3.2 Measurement of Key Variables
The data contain an observation for each census tract for each year from 1997-2003.
The dependent variable is the incidence of childhood blood lead poisoning, by census tract
from 1997 to 2003 in Chicago, Illinois. The variable is calculated as the number of children
under six years of age living in a census tract testing positive for lead poisoning divided
by the total number of children under six screened in that tract, in each year.7 Table 1.1
summarizes the calculation of key variables. For the purposes of this paper, a child testing
at or above 10 µg/dL is considered lead poisoned. While there are different definitions of
lead poisoning in children, 10 µg/dL is the most widely accepted standard (CDC, 2000).
The mean across all tracts and all years is 12.72% (Table 1.2). As expected, there is a
marked downward trend in the incidence of EBLs by year.
The remediation variable is calculated as the number of addresses remediated at least
once in a census tract up to or in the year of the observation divided by the number of
pre-1978 housing units in the tract.8 This metric, in effect, measures the healthiness of the
housing stock in a census tract at a point in time. I also calculate the variable as the number
of addresses remediated at least once up to but not including the current year divided by
the number of pre-1978 housing units in the tract. This metric is, in a sense, a lagged
version of the former remediation variable. It measures the “healthiness” of the housing
stock at the beginning of the given year rather than at the end. The mean value for the
standard and lagged remediation variables are 1.53% and 1.41%, respectively (Table 1.2).
7Lead screens are mandatory for all children at various ages in Chicago. Therefore, the sample of screens
should be representative of all children in Chicago. However, there is undoubtedly some level of targeted
screening, which would bias the EBL rate upward. The rate of screening in Chicago is high enough that this
is not likely a problem. I also estimated all models using the total number of children rather than the number
of screens as the denominator in the percentage of children with an EBL. The impact of remediations was
only slightly lower. This is to be expected given that this metric is the absolute minimum of the percentage
of children with an EBL.
8I estimate the annual number of pre-1978 housing units using the number of pre-1980 units from the 1990
census and the yearly number of demolitions of residential buildings. I assume that the number of housing
units built in the 1970’s was evenly distributed across the decade. Thus, I subtract two years of housing data
from the pre-1980 number to arrive at an estimate for pre-1978 housing units measured in 1990. I assume
that any residential building demolished in Chicago prior to 2006 was constructed prior to 1978. Thus each
demolition will decrease the number of pre-1978 housing units by one. Since there are likely to be multiple
housing units in many of the demolished buildings, this metric overestimates the number of pre-1978 housing
units per year.
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The lagged value is necessarily lower since it contains the same information as the standard
metric minus the current year’s remediation data. It is likely that the remediation variables
increase over time in each tract since the numerators are cumulative totals of remediations
and the denominators, the number of pre-1978 housing units, are relatively stable.
The complete set of control variables and instruments, all by census tract, are: the per-
centage of housing units built prior to 1950, the percentage of occupied housing units that
are occupied by the owner, the percentage of housing units occupied, median household
income (year 2000 dollars), the proportion of the population that is black race, the propor-
tion that is of Hispanic origin, and the percentage of families that receive public assistance.
The yearly values of all census variables, with the exception of the percentage of housing
units built prior to 19509, are estimated with the assumption that the variables increase or
decrease at a constant linear rate between the 1990 and 2000 censuses continuing until 2003.
I constructed a variable that approximates the risk of exposure in a census tract and
year (i.e. a way of weighting areas by the potential total lead exposure to children). The
metric denotes whether a tract is in the top 25% of tracts with respect to both the number
of children in poverty and the number of housing units built prior to 1950. The risk variable
measures whether there is likely to be a high level of poorly-maintained, older housing in
an area.
Table 1.3 reports the incidence of EBLs by remediation and census variables. Without
controlling for any other factors, tracts with higher levels of remediations also have higher
rates of EBLs (Table 1.2). EBLs increase with the age of housing and the proportion of the
population that is black race and decline with rates of owner occupancy and median income.
It is clear that the rate of lead poisoning has declined over time across all variables (Table
1.3). In general, the relationships between quartiles persist in all years. Furthermore, the
effect of time has a consistent impact for all quartiles within a variable. For example, the
pattern of decline in EBLs seen in the first quartile for black race is very similar to the
9This variable is calculated in a similar fashion to the number of pre-1978 housing units. I assume that
each residential demolition is in a building built before 1950. I begin with the number of pre-1950 housing
units from the 1990 census. For each year, I subtract the number of demolitions from the numerator and
denominator to arrive at the yearly percentage of units built prior to 1950.
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decline seen in the fourth quartile.
1.4 Methods
1.4.1 Conceptual Framework
I am most interested in the sign and magnitude of the coefficient on the remediation
variable. Given that remediations have proven to lower BLLs in children through reduced
exposure to lead hazards, a healthier housing stock should, all things considered, lead to a
lower incidence of lead poisoning for children living there. Furthermore, I will observe any
spillover effect (i.e., if a single remediation prevents lead poisoning in more than one child).
For instance, the treatment of lead hazards in the home reduces the potential exposure
both to children currently living in the home and to those that will live there in the future.
Children playing in and around the housing unit will also benefit from reduced exposure.
Additionally, I am interested in how the impact of prevention varies over time. Because lead
safe work practices and lead dust control have improved over time, remediations in later
years may be more effective.
The list of covariates was chosen because they provide evidence for the age and condition
of the housing stock in the census tracts. Lead exposure tends to be greatest in older,
poorly-maintained housing. The percentage of units built prior to 1950 is an estimate of
the percentage of units in a census tract that contain lead paint. The percentages of units
that are owner occupied, families receiving public assistance, and median household income
are related to the condition of the housing stock. Controlling for all other risk factors, older
housing and the percentage of families receiving public assistance should have a positive
relationship with EBLs, while owner occupancy and median income should have an inverse
relationship.
The race and Hispanic origin variables were included because past studies attempting
to predict lead poisoning in children have shown that areas with high proportions of black
and Hispanic residents tend to have higher incidences of lead poisoning (Melman et al.,
1998; Pirkle et al., 1998). The association with black race should subside once the age and
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condition of housing are properly controlled for since there is no medical or theoretical basis
for black children to have higher EBLs. In contrast, Hispanic origin may retain a significant
positive relationship with EBLs since Hispanic children are much more likely to be exposed
to lead from cultural sources such as pottery and folk remedies.
I also estimate the different impact of remediations among populations sensitive to ex-
posure to lead. Areas with a greater percentage of young children living in older housing
will be more likely to react favorably to remediations. Similarly, it is worthwhile to investi-
gate whether remediations have a greater impact in areas with a high proportion of black
residents, a group that despite the nationwide decreases in BLLs still maintains a relatively
high rate of poisoning among children. I estimate the differential impacts across various
subsections of the population, by interacting the risk and race variables with the measures
of the “health” of the housing stock. If remediations are effectively targeted to reach these
populations, they may have a greater impact on the reduction of EBLs in high-risk tracts.
I also include time interactions with the race and risk variables to determine whether the
impact of these factors on lead lead poisoning have changed over time.
1.4.2 Panel Analysis
The basic specification for the incidence of EBLs in a census tract is:
EBLit = β0 + β1Rit + β′2rit + β
′
3Xit + αt + it (1.1)
where EBLit is the percentage of children screened in census tract i that tested positive
for lead poisoning measured in year t. The variable Rit is the measure of the health of
the housing stock, calculated as the percentage of pre-1978 housing units remediated. The
vector rit is the remediation variable interacted with the race and risk variables as well
as the year dummy variables. The vector Xit contains exogenous covariates, which may
include the percentage of housing units built before 1950, the proportions of the population
that are black race and Hispanic origin, the percentage of housing units that are occupied,
the percentage of occupied housing units that are owner occupied, the percentage of the
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population receiving public assistance, median household income, and various interactions
with year dummy variables. αt is a vector of year dummy variables.
In the first specification (Model 1) I regress the EBL outcome on the percentage of
housing units remediated, a set of covariates, and year dummy variables. Inclusion of the
year dummies controls for any unobserved time effect that affects all census tracts. For
instance, the effect of the ban in gasoline and the subsequent reduction in the amount of
ambient lead over time would be picked up by the year dummies.
There is a potential source of unobserved heterogeneity that could lead to biased param-
eter estimates of the remediation variable. Per conversations with CDPH staff, some areas
in Chicago are “problem” regions (i.e., they have a high level of lead activity both in terms
of identified cases of lead poisoning and remediations). Thus, census tracts with high levels
of EBLs will also tend to have high levels of remediation. The differential employment of
lead prevention resources in these areas equates to endogenous program placement. A fail-
ure to account for this endogeneity, will cause the estimates for the impact of remediations
on EBLs to be biased upwards.
In order to account for “problem” tracts, I include census tract fixed effects (Model 2). I
replace the dependent and explanatory variables with deviations of individual observations
in a census tract from the mean for that tract rather than including a dummy variable for
each tract.10 Any time invariant census tract factors are differenced out in the process. As
long as the unobserved variation across tracts caused by the problem areas does not vary
over time in tracts, the fixed effects will account for the heterogeneity problem. In order for
these OLS estimates to be unbiased there must be no correlation between the differenced
right hand side variables and the error term. The model is:
EBLit = γ1Rit + γ′2rit + γ
′
4Xit + αt + γi + it (1.2)
A potential problem with the first two specifications is that the percentage of units
remediated is potentially endogenous and determined simultaneously with the dependent
10Adding deviations from the mean avoids introducing N-1 additional parameters.
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variable. This is the case if remediations are the result of a positive blood lead test. If so,
remediations are not a source of exogenous variation and in fact, blood lead tests and reme-
diations are highly correlated. As mentioned earlier, this problem of reverse causality will
cause OLS estimates of the impact of remediations to be biased upwards. Fortunately, not
all remediations are the result of a positive blood lead test. It was noted in the background
section of the paper that remediations are also ordered in all federally-assisted housing
units built before 1978 and can be ordered in any unit built before 1978 with identified lead
hazards. The CDPH does not record the impetus for any lead inspection or remediation
and thus one is left to speculate what percentage of the units were remediated because
of a positive blood lead screen. However, given any reverse causality between EBLs and
remediations, the endogeneity problem remains and must be addressed.
The way in which the remediation variables are constructed should alleviate the en-
dogeneity problem. Reverse causality is only a problem if the remediation occurs after a
positive blood lead test (i.e., the inspection is ordered because a poisoned child is living
there). The remediation metrics in this paper measure a history of lead poisoning in a given
area. The history includes remediations from past years and the current year. I measure
the impact of this history on the current incidence of lead poisoning. Since current cases of
lead poisoning cannot drive past remediations, the problem of reverse causality should be
minor.
To further purge the analysis of reverse causality, I use a remediation variable that
captures only those remediations that occurred in years prior to the given year (Model
3). For instance, in 2000, the dependent variable is the number of EBLs in 2000 divided
by the number of children screened in 2000 (i.e., measured at the beginning of 2000). The
alternate remediation variable is the percentage of addresses remediated up to the year 2000.
As mentioned above, since EBLs in 2000 most likely do not drive remediations in years prior
to 2000, there is no reverse causality. Thus, I am estimating the impact of remediations in
years past on the incidence of EBLs in the current year. The specification is identical to
equation 2 with the exception that the remediation variable (including interaction terms) is
measured at the beginning of year t rather than at the end.
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1.5 Results
Using Model 1 (no census tract fixed effects), I first include no interactions of the remedi-
ation variable with other variables (Model 1a) and then interact it with race, risk, and time
(Model 1b). In Model 1a, the percentage of units remediated has a large positive impact
on the incidence of EBLs (Table 1.4). A one percentage point increase in the percent of
units remediated is associated with a 2.39 percentage point increase in the proportion of
lead screens that uncovered an EBL. Interactions between the remediation variable and time
in Model 1b indicate that the positive effect is much more pronounced in the earlier years.
The total impact of remediations in 2003 is nearly zero. The coefficients for the remediation
variables in both Models 1a and 1b are precisely measured at the 1% level. The signs of the
remediation effects are troubling since increased remediation should reduce the incidence of
EBLs. This result lends evidence to the theory that there is unobserved variation in the
general level of lead poisoning activity across tracts and thus, the OLS estimate is biased
upwards.
The year dummies all have significant large negative impacts on the incidence of child-
hood lead poisoning. Furthermore, the estimates increase in magnitude, thus lead poisoning
is decreasing in all tracts over time. The year dummies pick up the unobserved homogeneous
effects of time. For instance, the amount of lead dust deposited from lead gasoline use is
consistent over an area with uniform vehicle traffic. This level of exposure declines over time
at a relatively constant rate in all census tracts and thus, is picked up in the coefficients on
the year dummy variables.
The effects of other explanatory variables are as expected. The percentage of owner
occupied housing and the median household income in a census tract have a negative impact
on the incidence of EBLs. High owner occupancy and median income are associated with a
housing stock in good condition and thus, a low likelihood of exposure to lead hazards. The
percentage of pre-1950 housing had a positive impact on the percent of EBLs. The result is
not surprising, as the primary source of lead exposure is lead-based paint in older housing
units. As in other lead risk factor studies, the proportion of the population of black race
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also has a positive impact of the incidence of EBLs.
Once I account for the census tract fixed effects (Model 2), the impact of remediations
on the incidence on EBLs is large and negative (Table 1.5). A one-tenth percentage point
increase in the percent remediated (a reasonable expected change given the yearly changes
in remediations observed in Table 1.2) is associated with over a five-tenths percentage point
reduction in the incidence of EBLs in a census tract. Citywide from 1997 to 2003, this
is equivalent to 1.75 fewer cases of lead poisoning per additional remediation. The results
are robust to alternative specifications that include various sets of control variables. The
reduction in EBLs from remediations is consistently between five to six-tenths of a percentage
point.
In Model 3, the impact of the alternate remediation variable is several standard devia-
tions greater than the original metric (Table 1.6). A one-tenth percentage point increase in
remediation is associated with almost a six-tenths percentage point increase in EBLs (Model
3a). The total effect of the alternate remediation construction is also slightly greater when
comparing the models with interactions (Models 2b and 3b). This lends some evidence
that there is a degree of reverse causality in the remediations included in the first metric.
While the results with and without the alternate remediation variable are different, when
translated into the number of averted cases of lead poisoning, the difference is less than one
hundred out of several thousand total cases.
Remediations have a greater negative impact on EBLs over time. When I add remedi-
ation/time interactions the effect of remediation in 1997 is not significantly different than
zero in Models 2b and 3b. However, remediations in subsequent years have a negative and
increasing impact on EBLs over time.
With census tract fixed effects, the year impacts are still significant and positive, however,
they are smaller in magnitude. It appears that the year effects in Model 1 were capturing
some of the census tract effects that are accounted for in the fixed effects model. Lastly,
black race is no longer a powerful predictor of EBLs. It is likely that black race was
proxying for “problem tract” effects in the earlier models. The impact of race and to some
extent the risk variable (measured as tracts with high levels of older housing and children
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in poverty) play a declining role in the positive prediction of EBLs over time. In particular,
the positive relationship between race and EBLs observed in 1997 (although imprecisely
measured) disappears over time. The reduction cannot be explained by remediations as
they have no greater impact in areas with a high proportion of black residents nor in “high-
risk” areas.
1.6 Cost-Benefit Analysis
Because primary prevention is really the only way to prevent the devastating health
effects that lead poisoning causes in children, it seems clear that funds and efforts should
be devoted toward eliminating exposure rather than treating children once they are sick.
However, the rate of childhood lead poisoning is declining by several percentage points each
year without the contributions of lead remediations. It is possible that the cost of prevention
outweighs the benefits of the associated reduction in lead poisoned children. In this section
I estimate the benefits of an investment in the housing stock and compare them with the
cost of the associated remediations.
1.6.1 Benefits
The benefits are the improved health and reductions in treatment costs for those children
who would have been lead poisoned if not for the prevention. Figure 1 shows the basic
pathway from increased remediations to the resulting benefits. The impact of increased
remediations on EBLs is represented by arrow 1. Arrow 2a is the effect of reduced BLLs on
cognitive ability. I estimate the decline in treatment costs as the average cost of treatment
for childhood lead poisoning multiplied by the number of cases prevented (arrow 2b). Lead
exposure in children has also been linked to behavioral disorders and criminal activity,
primarily due to the damaging neurological effects of lead (arrow 2c). Unfortunately, it is
difficult to estimate the proportion of crime and delinquent behavior attributable to lead.
Therefore, I note that there are potential benefits to society in this area from reduced EBLs,
but I do not include estimates of such benefits in the analysis.
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Effect on Earnings
One way to measure the health gains of the decline in lead poisoning is the prevention of
declines in cognitive ability (arrow 2a). There is a well-developed literature that estimates
levels of cognitive decline from lead as reductions in childhood IQ (Table 1.7). Schwartz
(1994) and Salkever (1995) quantified the benefit of improved IQ as the increase in expected
lifetime earnings (arrow 3). The increase in earnings potential is the primary benefit ad-
dressed in this paper. I incorporate the results of the two studies in my benefits estimation
with several caveats discussed below.
The earnings benefits of increased remediations can be interpreted as a combination of
arrows 1, 2a, and 3 in Figure 1. Quantifying these benefits is problematic for two reasons:
1) It is difficult to measure the benefit of an additional IQ point in dollars (arrow 3) and
2) I measure the impact of reductions in the percentage and therefore the number of lead
poisoned children (arrow 1) while the cognitive effects literature generally measures the
impact of the average lifetime BLL on IQ. I cannot determine the level of the reduction but
simply that it has dropped below the 10 µg/dL threshold (arrow 2a).
There is a debate in the recent literature as to the magnitude and importance of the
impact of BLLs on cognitive ability. The majority of studies have found that low level lead
exposure is associated with a reduction in childhood IQ. There are a few studies that point
out that the cognitive declines associated with lead are very small compared to those of
other proven factors (Heben, 2001; Kaufman, 2001a; Kaufman, 2001b). They also raise
questions related to the methods of analyses that have found significant declines in IQ from
lead exposure. However, even the authors of these papers note that there are likely impacts
on cognitive ability at low levels of lead exposure.
The range of the magnitude of the effects varies from a 0.46 point reduction associated
with a 1 µg/dL increase in BLL to a 9.6 point reduction from a one log point increase in BLL
(Table 1.7). In a metaanalysis by Schwartz (1994a), the author estimated that a 1 µg/dL
increase in BLL was associated with a 0.245 point decline in IQ across all BLLs. Canfeld
et al. (2003) found that a 1 µg/dL increase in BLL was associated with a 0.46 decrease in
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IQ. More importantly, they found that at BLLs below 10 µg/dL, a 1 µg/dL increase in BLL
was associated with a 0.74 decrease in IQ. A host of studies confirm that there are indeed
significant detrimental effects on IQ associated with BLLs below 10 µg/dL and that in fact,
the effects are greater at lower BLLs (Bellinger and Needleman, 2003; Canfeld et al., 2003;
Lidsky and Schneider, 2003).
While I have a reliable estimate of the number of lead poisoning cases prevented, I
do not observe the magnitude of the decline in BLL. At best, I can assert that in each
case, the BLL declines from above 10 µg/dL to below 10 µg/dL. In an individual child
level study, the authors found that the mean BLL of children moving back into remediated
homes declined from 11.0 to 9.3 (-1.7) after six months and from 11.0 to 8.2 (-2.8) after
twelve months (Galke et al., 2001). They did not investigate whether BLLs continued to
decline after twelve months. These are useful estimates if I assume that children are already
lead poisoned. However, a major assertion in this paper is that a fraction of children moving
or born into remediated homes will be spared from lead exposure altogether. Thus, it is
reasonable to expect that some children will have BLLs of 0 µg/dL rather than 10 µg/dL
or even higher.
I incorporate all this information to estimate bounds on the increase in IQ from reduc-
tions in childhood lead poisoning (Table 1.8). For the minimum, I use Schwartz’s estimate
of a 0.245 point increase in IQ for each 1 µg/dL decline in BLL across all BLLs. This is a
reasonable minimum since preventing lead poisoning means reducing BLLs below 10 µg/dL
and recent studies have shown that the impact on IQ is greater below 10 µg/dL. I also
assume a minimum decline of 2.8 µg/dL (from 11.0 to 8.2) found in Galke et al. (2001)
after twelve months. This is a reasonable minimum reduction in BLL for reasons discussed
above. Thus, the lower bound on the increase in IQ associated with the prevention of a
single case of childhood lead poisoning is 0.69 (0.245 * 2.8: row 4, column1 Table 1.8).
I use the 0.74 IQ point increase associated with a 1 µg/dL decline at lower BLLs found
in Canfeld et al. (2003) as a conservative maximum rise in IQ. This is a reasonable estimate
given that any prevented case of lead poisoning will result in a BLL below 10 µg/dL. I assume
a conservative maximum 5 µg/dL drop in BLL for each case of lead poisoning averted. The
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5 µg/dL decline is an average change across prevented cases of lead poisoning. It does
not assume a 5 µg/dL decline for each case averted. Some individuals will observe a small
decrease while others will see a large drop in BLL. Given that Galke et al. (2001) found
that mean BLLs of poisoned children drop 2.8 µg/dL after only twelve months and that
some children will be spared BLLs 10 µg/dL or greater, this is a reasonable estimate. Using
these two estimates, the upper bound on the increase in IQ associated with the prevention
of a single case of lead poisoning is 3.7 (0.74 * 5.0: row 4, column 2 Table 1.8).
Several recent studies have sought to estimate the impact of IQ on earnings potential
(Schwartz, 1994; Salkever,1995). In general, they estimate the total effect of IQ as the
direct effect on earnings through lower cognitive ability, and the indirect effects through
schooling and lower rates of participation in the labor force. They argue that IQ loss affects
schooling and therefore expected wages and the level of participation (i.e., hours worked).
Schwartz found that a one point increase in IQ was associated with a combined 1.76%
increase in expected lifetime earnings. Salkever found a 1.931% increase for males and a
3.225% increase for females. Both studies estimate a linear relationship between IQ and
earnings
These estimates are problematic for several reasons. First it is unlikely that IQ impacts
earnings equally across all potential workers. This casts doubt on their assumption of a linear
relationship between IQ and earnings, particularly when looking at such a small incremental
change (one IQ point). Second, the importance of a one or two point change in IQ for an
individual is questionable in relation to the number of other traits that impact earnings (e.g.,
socioeconomic status and family characteristics). However, when considered across the entire
population, a several point change seems rather significant, particularly in the tails of the
distribution where a small change can move individuals out of the disabled category and
conversely, individuals into the genius classification. It is also important to consider that
a one point change across the population is the average result. Some individuals will have
greater increases in IQ while others will observe very little change. I calculate the increased
expected lifetime earnings using the estimates in both Schwartz (1994) and Salkever (1995)
with these caveats in mind.
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I employ the basic methodology developed in Schwartz (1994) to calculate the discounted
net present value of the expected lifetime earnings of a five-year-old child for males and
females separately. I chose to estimate the value for a five-year-old because I am estimating
the impact of IQ on earnings and IQ is generally measured in school age children.11 I use
the distribution of wages for males and females at each age measured in 2000 and assume
that each child will work from 15 to 65 years of age. Based on several recent studies that
have estimated expected lifetime earnings, I assume a 1% annual increase in wages for
both males and females (Landrigan, 2002; Muir, 2001; Salkever, 1995; Schwartz, 1994;). I
estimate net present value of earnings using a 3% discount rate. The discounted expected
lifetime earnings for males and females are reported in rows 7 in Table 1.8. The average for
males and females is reported in columns 1 and 2 in row 7.
Medical Care Expenditures
In a study by Kemper et al. (1998), the authors estimate the costs associated with each
component of curative care for lead poisoned children. Korfmacher (2003) uses these costs
and estimates the cost of curative care at various BLLs. The cost of care for BLLs between
10 and 19 µg/dL is $63.34 per child adjusted to 2000 dollars. This is the cost of basic follow-
up care for lead poisoned children including screens, and in-home visits by nurses. Since I
measure the decline in cases of lead poisoning, the appropriate cost savings should occur
near the threshold for poisoning. The $63.34 observed from 10 to 19 µg/dL is a reasonable
expectation for the treatment costs saved for each prevented case of lead poisoning (row 9).
This figure is a minimum estimate for treatment cost savings. Remediations reduce lead
exposure for all BLLs, not only those near 10 µg/dL. I do not include the potentially large
cost savings at higher BLLs (several thousand dollars per case averted) such as reduced
hospitalization and chelations.
11The expected lifetime earnings for children under five years of age will vary slightly according to the
assumed annual increase in real wages (1%). The expected number of years worked is the same for all
children, but the younger children will have slightly higher real wages at each age because of the increase
in productivity. They will necessarily have larger undiscounted expected lifetime earnings. However, the
discount rate (3%) is greater than the rise in productivity. Thus, the discounted net present value of
expected earnings for younger children will be less than that for those five years of age.
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1.6.2 Costs
It is relatively simple to identify the costs of prevention. The cost is simply the cost of
the remediations necessary to treat lead hazards in homes. The prices of remediations are
available and thus, the cost of improving a housing stock is fairly accurately represented by
simply the cost of treating lead hazards in a given number of units.
Per conversations with CDPH staff, the average cost under their abatement grant pro-
grams is $7,750 per housing unit (row 2 of Table 1.8).12 The number of remediations
necessary to increase the percentage of pre-1978 housing units treated by one-tenth of a
percent is 2,081 (row 1 of Table 1.8). If the average cost of these remediations is $7,750,
then the total cost of improving remediations by one-tenth of a percent is $16,128,000.
1.6.3 Benefits Versus Costs
Table 1.8 lists all the estimated costs and benefits discussed above. I simulate the
estimated number of lead poisoning cases averted from a one-tenth percentage increase in
remediations using the specification in Model 3a (arrow 1, Figure 1).13 The additional 2,081
remediations lead to 3,506 fewer cases of childhood lead poisoning (row 3). The result is
precisely measured at a 1% significance level. Row 4 lists the lower and upper bounds on the
increase in IQ from a prevented case of childhood lead poisoning (arrow 2b). Row 5 reports
the estimated percentage increase in expected lifetime earnings from a one point increase in
IQ taken from Schwartz (1994) and Salkever (1995). Assuming a constant linear relationship
between IQ and earnings the percentage increase in lifetime earnings from a prevented case
(row 6) is the rise in IQ (row 4) multiplied by the percentage increase from one additional
IQ point (row 5). Incorporating the figures from Schwartz (1994), the lower and upper
bounds are 1.21% and 6.51%, respectively. Using the figures from Salkever (1995), I find
that the lower bound on the percentage changes in earnings is 1.33% for males and 2.23%
12The median cost is $6,795 per housing unit.
13I draw from the variance-covariance matrix assuming a normal distribution and then apply the draw to
the vector of coefficients found using Model 3b. For each draw, I estimate the number of cases averted. I
repeat this until the SE of the number of cases converges. The standard errors for the number of cases and
for the cost savings are reported in Table 1.8.
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for females. The upper bounds for males and females are 7.14% and 11.93%, respectively
(row 4).
The discounted net present values for estimated lifetime earnings for five year-old boys
and girls are $519,631 and $881,027, respectively (U.S. BLS, 1999). I use the average value,
$700,329, in the first two columns since I do not have earnings estimated separately for males
and females. I multiply the percentage change in earnings (row 6) by the expected earnings
(row 7) to calculate the average change in expected lifetime earnings from a prevented
case of childhood lead poisoning (row 8). The estimates range from roughly $8,000 to over
$60,000 per case. Row 10 contains the total increase in earnings from all averted cases of
lead poisoning from a one-tenth percentage point increase in remediations (row 3 * row 8).14
Row 9 lists the average cost of curative care for a case of lead poisoning with a BLL
between 10 and 19 µg/dL, $63.34. I multiply this estimate by the total number of cases
prevented (row 3) to arrive at the total medical care cost savings from the increase in
remediations (row 11). The total estimated benefits from the increase in remediations is the
increase in expected lifetime earnings (row 10) plus the costs savings from reduced curative
medical care (row 11).
The total savings from a one-tenth percentage point increase in the percentage of housing
units remediated ranges from $14 million to over $200 million. The estimates incorporating
the figures from Salkever (1995) are within two standard errors of the estimates using the
Schwartz (1994) figures. The differences between the two benefit/cost ratios are driven
by the higher estimates of earnings increases from a reduction in IQ in Salkever (1995),
particularly among females.
1.7 Discussion
Once I account for the unobserved effects of census tracts and time, the percentage of
addresses remediated in a census tract has an inverse relationship with the incidence of
EBLs in that area. Because OLS will provide estimates that are biased upwards toward
14In columns 3 and 4, I assume that half of the prevented cases are in males and half in females. The
change in earnings is thus, 0.5(row 1)(row 6, males) + 0.5(row 1)(row 6, females).
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zero for the impact of remediations, any coefficients can be interpreted as lower bounds (in
magnitude) on the range of effects. Furthermore, the magnitude of the impact is feasible
given the summary statistics (Table 1.2). A one-tenth percent increase in the percent of
addresses remediated is well within the range of potential changes. The resulting six tenths
percent decrease in the incidence is also feasible given the dramatic declines in EBLs over
time.
Applying these results citywide, roughly 1.75 cases of lead poisoning are prevented for
each housing unit remediated. Because this ratio is greater than 1:1, there is some spillover
effect of remediations. This spillover effect can be attributed to several sources. Multiple
children living in a housing unit should all benefit from an effective remediation. Thus, it
is certainly feasible that all young siblings will observe a decline in BLLs. Although less
likely to produce this large of a spillover effect, it is also possible that children visiting the
home will have lower BLLs. These spillover effects are potentially larger if the lead hazards
are on the outside of the home, primarily in the form of lead contaminated soil. There is
also a positive spillover to future child tenants in treated housing units. The last possible
explanation is that children that were once poisoned receive multiple passing screens. This
would bias the percentage of EBLs downward and the impact of remediation upwards. This
is unlikely as children with multiple screens are more likely to have positive than negative
screens since follow-up is ordered only in poisoned children.
Remediation was more effective in reducing childhood lead poisoning in later years. It has
been noted that the requirements for proper lead remediation have become more stringent
over time. Most importantly, the regulations now require that lead dust be controlled.
Additionally, anyone performing a lead remediation must be certified in lead safe work
practices. These strict guidelines may be driving the increased efficacy of remediations over
time. This also means that the expiration of older remediations are not having a meaningful
negative impact on the “healthiness” of the housing stock. It is likely that once a housing
unit has been remediated, parents and landlords work to ensure that the units remain free
of lead hazards. Thus, over time, the preventive action continues to avert cases in siblings,
playmates, and future tenants.
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There is, perhaps, a time-varying factor in tracts that differentially impacts areas deemed
to be “high risk” and with a high proportion of black residents. Since the CDPH fully knows
which areas are high risk, they may have increased intervention efforts over time in these
areas. It is reasonable to assume that this increased awareness over time would decrease the
risk of lead exposure in these tracts. A differential impact of awareness would explain the
observed declining importance of race as a predictor of childhood lead poisoning over time
(Tables 1.5 and 1.6).
Across all the models, the magnitudes of the impacts of the covariates were very small.
Even the percent of pre-1978 housing units, thought to be a very accurate predictor of lead
poisoning, had little impact on the dependent variable. This finding provides evidence that
the condition of the housing is far more important than the age. The age variable was
most likely acting as a proxy for condition in other lead studies that found large, significant
effects.
The costs savings in Chicago from a small increase in remediation is potentially several
hundred million dollars. While this estimate may seem high, it is a reasonable figure for
Chicago given the nationwide estimates reported in the literature. Several studies have
estimated that the benefit of small reductions in lead exposure nationwide could be tens
of billions of dollars (Schwartz, 1994; Salkever, 1995; Landrigan et al., 2002). One study
estimated that the benefit of reduced lead exposure since 1976 has been between $100 and
$300 billion (Grosse et al., 2002). In addition, the benefits of remediation will continue
to increase over time. A single remediation can potentially prevent lead exposure for all
children living in that home in the future. Therefore, improving the “healthiness” of the
housing stock benefits all future generations.
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Table 1.1: Glossary of key terms
Term Definition
lead screen A blood lead test to determine if a child has lead poisoning;
a positive result is anything over 10 µg/dL
lead inspection Any of three types of lead inspection (inspection, risk assessment,
lead hazard screen)
lead remediation Any process by which lead hazards are addressed in a home
whether it is a remediation, mitigation, or full abatement
Key variables
incidence of lead poisoning [# of children under age 6 with a positive test]/
[# of children under age 6 screened], by tract and year
% remediations [# of pre-78 units with at least 1 rem in or prior to current year]/
[# of pre-78 units], by tract and year
% rem (alternate) [# of pre-78 units with at least 1 rem prior to current year]/
[# of pre-78 units], by tract and year
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Table 1.3: Mean %EBLs by the dependent, abatement, and control variables (quartiles)
Variable 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
% remediated
1st quartile 9.48 7.24 5.86 5.48 3.60 2.65 2.29
2nd quartile 12.15 9.23 7.98 5.72 4.70 3.52 2.16
3rd quartile 25.80 20.78 16.12 12.55 9.27 6.45 4.43
4th quartile 43.02 35.24 30.06 25.84 20.38 16.07 11.11
% remediated (alternate)
1st quartile 9.53 7.32 6.04 5.43 3.69 2.61 2.29
2nd quartile 12.08 9.57 7.95 6.26 4.64 3.66 2.33
3rd quartile 25.30 20.67 16.93 13.02 9.13 6.37 4.07
4th quartile 42.29 35.26 30.08 25.87 20.34 15.84 11.03
% pre-1950
1st quartile 15.76 13.71 11.85 10.14 7.91 5.74 4.20
2nd quartile 26.67 22.41 19.19 16.84 13.92 11.12 7.79
3rd quartile 25.43 20.58 17.15 15.02 11.44 9.68 6.95
4th quartile 15.40 11.84 10.66 8.93 6.70 4.95 3.57
% black race
1st quartile 8.71 7.44 5.92 4.75 3.75 2.71 2.00
2nd quartile 12.42 8.72 8.41 6.00 4.86 3.60 2.92
3rd quartile 24.60 20.44 17.57 16.13 12.50 10.32 6.42
4th quartile 36.43 31.01 26.66 24.27 19.43 15.57 11.10
% Hispanic origin
1st quartile 34.42 28.83 24.96 22.34 17.73 13.66 10.14
2nd quartile 19.37 16.56 14.24 13.23 10.44 8.7 5.96
3rd quartile 11.29 9.05 8.09 6.69 5.36 3.89 2.80
4th quartile 16.80 13.01 10.95 8.65 6.75 5.56 3.97
% receiving public assistance
1st quartile 6.61 5.49 5.15 4.52 4.35 3.57 2.68
2nd quartile 8.81 7.64 7.41 6.64 5.98 4.94 4.48
3rd quartile 18.87 16.75 15.63 14.80 12.56 11.16 8.26
4th quartile 36.35 30.58 26.46 24.32 19.18 15.43 10.74
median HH income
1st quartile 34.96 28.74 24.27 22.31 17.51 14.26 9.51
2nd quartile 24.06 20.30 17.62 16.30 13.28 10.93 8.43
3rd quartile 12.41 10.83 10.11 8.6 7.29 5.51 3.97
4th quartile 7.57 6.40 5.95 4.65 3.12 2.28 2.02
Note: The 1st quartile is the lowest 25% of values for the given variable,
the 4th is the highest 25%.
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Table 1.4: Results from Model 1 (OLS)
Model
Variable 1a 1b
Intercept 8.888 (1.468) *** 10.068 (1.295) ***
% addresses remediated 2.387 (0.070) *** 5.770 (0.201) ***
% pre-1950 0.068 (0.005) *** 0.057 (0.004) ***
% black race 0.131 (0.005) *** 0.183 (0.007) ***
% hispanic origin 0.013 (0.006) ** -0.003 (0.005)
% owner occupied 0.010 (0.006) * 0.005 (0.005)
% occupied -0.038 (0.015) ** -0.078 (0.013) ***
% receiving public assistance 0.138 (0.015) *** 0.010 (0.014) *
median HH income 0.013 (0.005) ** -0.010 (0.005) **
1998 dummy -3.836 (0.377) *** -1.606 (0.493) ***
1999 dummy -6.458 (0.379) *** -2.222 (0.490) ***
2000 dummy -8.711 (0.381) *** -3.425 (0.487) ***
2001 dummy -11.654 (0.384) *** -4.093 (0.486) ***
2002 dummy -13.989 (0.389) *** -4.675 (0.486) ***
2003 dummy -16.416 (0.394) *** -4.771 (0.487) ***
% remediated * black race 0.289 (0.084) ***
% remediated * high risk variable 0.762 (0.187) ***
% remediated * 1998 -1.391 (0.256) ***
% remediated * 1999 -2.238 (0.246) ***
% remediated * 2000 -3.097 (0.236) ***
% remediated * 2001 -3.649 (0.231) ***
% remediated * 2002 -4.210 (0.226) ***
% remediated * 2003 -4.787 (0.222) ***
% black race * 1998 -0.021 (0.009) **
% black race * 1999 -0.050 (0.009) ***
% black race * 2000 -0.048 (0.009) ***
% black race * 2001 -0.084 (0.009) ***
% black race * 2002 -0.105 (0.009) ***
% black race * 2003 -0.134 (0.009) ***
% high risk * 1998 -0.306 (0.678)
% high risk * 1999 -0.635 (0.742)
% high risk * 2000 -1.703 (0.822) **
% high risk * 2001 -1.606 (0.913) *
% high risk * 2002 -0.821 (0.968)
% high risk * 2003 -1.239 (1.049)
∗∗∗indicates significance at the 1% level; ∗∗5% level; ∗10% level.
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Table 1.5: Results from Model 2 - Census Tract Fixed Effects
Model
Variable 2a 2b
Intercept 1.157 (26.741) 30.740 (26.127)
% addresses remediated -5.355 (0.315) *** 0.693 (0.487)
% pre-1950 0.319 (0.413) -0.084 (0.403)
% black race 0.028 (0.060) 0.080 (0.062)
% Hispanic origin 0.216 (0.032) *** 0.033 (0.026)
% receiving public assistance 0.321 (0.045) *** 0.061 (0.026) **
% owner occupied -0.133 (0.087) * -0.134 (0.080) *
% occupied -0.021 (0.069) -0.032 (0.062)
median HH income 0.078 (0.030) ** -0.051 (0.029) *
1998 dummy -2.965 (0.309) *** -1.512 (0.402) ***
1999 dummy -4.272 (0.328) *** -1.838 (0.389) ***
2000 dummy -5.066 (0.353) *** -3.001 (0.393) ***
2001 dummy -6.744 (0.401) *** -3.453 (0.408) ***
2002 dummy -7.987 (0.446) *** -3.920 (0.426) ***
2003 dummy -9.392 (0.491) *** -3.860 (0.463) ***
% remediated * black race 0.010 (0.135)
% remediated * risk variable -0.035 (0.226)
% remediated * 1998 -1.169 (0.261) ***
% remediated * 1999 -1.724 (0.255) ***
% remediated * 2000 -2.153 (0.249) ***
% remediated * 2001 -2.522 (0.265) ***
% remediated * 2002 -2.829 (0.262) ***
% remediated * 2003 -3.200 ((0.289) ***
% black race * 1998 -0.017 (0.008) **
% black race * 1999 -0.041 (0.009) ***
% black race * 2000 -0.037 (0.008) ***
% black race * 2001 -0.066 (0.008) ***
% black race * 2002 -0.086 (0.009) ***
% black race * 2003 -0.112 (0.009) ***
% high risk * 1998 0.149 (0.405)
% high risk * 1999 -0.101 (0.437)
% high risk * 2000 -0.735 (0.472) *
% high risk * 2001 -0.625 (0.521)
% high risk * 2002 -0.096 (0.579)
% high risk * 2003 -0.301 (0.649)
∗∗∗indicates significance at the 1% level; ∗∗5% level; ∗10% level.
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Table 1.6: Results from Model 3 - Census Tract Fixed Effects with Alternate Remediation
Variable
Model
Variable 3a 3b
Intercept 1.197 (25.436) 33.892 (25.739)
% addresses remediated -5.920 (0.294) *** 0.145 (0.484)
% pre-1950 0.366 (0.391) -0.109 (0.397)
% black race 0.018 (0.060) 0.071 (0.062)
% Hispanic origin 0.200 (0.030) *** 0.030 (0.026)
% receiving public assistance 0.325 (0.044) *** 0.040 (0.040)
% owner occupied -0.120 (0.085) -0.131 (0.080) *
% occupied -0.042 (0.069) -0.038 (0.062)
median HH income 0.071 (0.030) ** -0.054 (0.029) *
1998 dummy -3.281 (0.309) *** -1.510 (0.400) ***
1999 dummy -4.793 (0.323) *** -1.833 (0.387) ***
2000 dummy -5.664 (0.336) *** -2.979 (0.391) ***
2001 dummy -6.953 (0.381) *** -3.403 (0.403) ***
2002 dummy -8.051 (0.425) *** -3.886 (0.427) ***
2003 dummy -9.298 (0.469) *** -3.820 (0.463) ***
% remediated * black race 0.066 (0.144)
% remediated * risk variable -0.037 (0.240)
% remediated * 1998 -1.215 (0.272) ***
% remediated * 1999 -1.790 (0.262) ***
% remediated * 2000 -2.204 (0.248) ***
% remediated * 2001 -2.518 (0.266) ***
% remediated * 2002 -2.782 (0.263) ***
% remediated * 2003 -3.101 ((0.292) ***
% black race * 1998 -0.017 (0.008) **
% black race * 1999 -0.041 (0.009) ***
% black race * 2000 -0.037 (0.008) ***
% black race * 2001 -0.066 (0.008) ***
% black race * 2002 -0.085 (0.008) ***
% black race * 2003 -0.112 (0.009) ***
% high risk * 1998 0.164 (0.399)
% high risk * 1999 -0.078 (0.427)
% high risk * 2000 -0.765 (0.448) *
% high risk * 2001 -0.560 (0.511)
% high risk * 2002 0.162 (0.566)
% high risk * 2003 -0.328 (0.650)
∗∗∗indicates significance at the 1% level; ∗∗5% level; ∗10% level.
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Table 1.7: Summary of BLL and IQ loss literature
Citation BLL increase IQ point decrease
Canfeld et al. 2003 10 µg/dL increase in mean BLL 4.6
Canfeld et al. 2003 1 µg/dL increase in mean BLL 0.46
Canfeld et al. 2003 1 µg/dL inc in mean BLL for those never > 10 µg/dL 0.74
Lanphear et al. 2005 2.4 to 10 µg/dL 3.9
Lanphear et al. 2005 10 to 20 µg/dL 1.9
Lanphear et al. 2005 20 to 30 µg/dL 1.1
Schwartz 1994 10 to 20 µg/dL 2.6
Tong 2000 2.7 fold increase (one natural log point) 2.6-9.6
Wasserman et al. 2000 50% rise in prenatal BLL 1.07
Wasserman et al. 2000 50% rise in postnatal relative to prenatal levels 2.82
Wasserman et al. 1997 10 to 30 µg/dL 4.3
Note: Schwartz, 2002 is a metaanalysis.
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Figure 1.1: Benefit Pathway from Increased Remediation
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Chapter 2
The Impact of Public Health Insurance
Eligibility on Preventive Care Utilization
Among Children
2.1 Introduction
The medical community has long recognized and reported that preventive medical care
is an effective method of reducing health risks and driving down future medical costs (Co-
hen et al., 2008). Preventive care, such as a routine check-ups, is particularly important
in young children as it allows a physician to diagnose and correct conditions that could
potentially disrupt crucial stages of development. Given this estimated positive productive
effect and the benefit of good health for future happiness and prosperity, it is important to
identify the factors that restrict consumption of preventive care, e.g., routine well-child care
or immunizations. One commonly cited culprit is lack of health insurance. 18% of children
in families with incomes less than 200% of the federal poverty level did not have health in-
surance in 2004 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2007). Other barriers include lack of knowledge about
the benefits of preventive care, travel and time costs, differences in the valuation of future
health, and the priority assigned by families to preventive care relative to basic necessities,
e.g., food, education, and shelter. The expansions of the public insurance program Medicaid
and the rise of the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) from 1997 to 2003
to cover uninsured children provide an ideal setting to evaluate the role of health insurance
availability on preventive care consumption.
In this paper, I estimate the impact of expansions of two public health insurance pro-
grams, Medicaid and SCHIP, on the consumption of preventive care among children. More
specifically, I measure how eligibility for these programs effects the decision to consume
childhood preventive care. I will also study how changes in the consumption of preventive
care vary among subgroups, i.e., by race, country of origin, and parental education.
I use the variation in Medicaid and SCHIP eligibility criteria from 1997 to 2003 to
identify the impact of public health insurance availability on preventive care consumption.
Observed insurance coverage is an individual (or household) choice, even among those eligible
for Medicaid and SCHIP. In the study sample, over half of individuals who are eligible for
government provided health insurance do not enroll (comparable studies have found similar
rates using different nationally representative surveys and samples). I avoid biased estimates
of the effect of coverage on preventive care use by estimating the impact of individual public
health insurance eligibility, which varies exogenously across state and time during the period
of study, rather than the impact of the observed health insurance choice. States choose the
income levels and the age groups that their plans will cover. From 1997 to 2003 (as well as
during the previous and subsequent years), there was considerable variation in the eligibility
rules by state and time. Using the detailed income, state, and age data in the National
Health Interview Survey (NHIS), I construct individual level eligibility measures for each
child in the sample.
Two potential sources of bias remain when estimating the effect of eligibility on con-
sumption of preventive care: (1) omitted unobservable state and age group variation that
differentially impact eligibility rules and health care consumption and (2) an endogeneity
bias if, for example, sicker children have higher levels of utilization and are more likely to be
eligible because previous health care costs have driven down family income. If not addressed,
these sources will lead to biased coefficients on the relationship between consumption and
eligibility. I follow the methodology outlined in Currie and Gruber (1996) to address these
additional sources of bias, i.e., a combination of a full set of state/time/age fixed effects and
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a simulated state level eligibility metric to instrument for individual eligibility.
The two types of preventive care considered in this essay are preventive physician visits
and immunizations. The preventive visit variables characterize the regularity and source of
routine medical care. The immunization variables measure whether a child (0 to 6 years of
age) has ever had a particular vaccine (5 total), whether they are up-to date, and whether
the vaccines were administered at the age recommended by the CDC.
Eligibility for public health insurance is associated with a 14 percentage point increase
in the likelihood that a child has had a routine check-up in the previous twelve months.
Similarly, eligibility is associated with an increased likelihood of having visited any physician
in the last twelve months (10 percentage points), a usual source of care (4.3 percentage
points), and a usual source of preventive care (2.0 percentage points). Eligibility does not
increase the likelihood of having a physician’s office as a usual source of general or preventive
care. The impacts of eligibility are less than half of those for enrollment in public health
insurance - although the effects are clearly biased due to omitted unobserved variables that
influence both enrollment and utilization.
I find that eligibility is associated with a one to two percentage point increase in the like-
lihood of having single doses of and being up-to-date for the diphtheria and polio vaccines.
Eligibility has no positive effect on the other three immunizations. Conversely, enrollment
has a strong positive effect on the timeliness and completeness of the immunization se-
ries (without considering the endogenity of Medicaid and SCHIP enrollment). This finding
provides some evidence that there are unobserved characteristics that impact both enroll-
ment and utilization of immunization that are distinct from eligibility. Perhaps having a
physician’s office as a usual source of care (a variable influenced by enrollment but not by
eligibility) is an important factor in whether children have all their immunizations and have
them on time.
Evidence suggests that certain subpopulations react differently to the incentives provided
by public health insurance with regard to utilization of preventive care. The probability
of having a usual source of preventive care increases more for black children and those
neither black or white under eligibility. However, the increase in the likelihood of having
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a physician’s office as the usual source of preventive care is higher among white children.
Hispanic children and those born outside the U.S. were less likely to increase consumption
of the preventive medical visit variables considered in this study.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Medicaid expansion and the creation of SCHIP
Since the early 1980’s there have been several major federal expansions in Medicaid cov-
erage for young children and pregnant women. The purpose of the expansions was to reduce
the tens of millions of uninsured Americans by relaxing the income and age requirements
for enrollment into the program. Each successive expansion lowered the maximum family
income level (as a percentage of the federal poverty level - FPL) and increased the age at
which children could be considered eligible for Medicaid. Beginning in 1990, states were
required to cover pregnant women and children up to age 5 whose incomes were below 133%
of the FPL and had the option to cover them up to 185% while still receiving federal match-
ing funds. By 1996, there were 31.5 million Americans enrolled in Medicaid (11.8 percent of
the total population). Additionally, 29% of children in households with incomes from 100%
to 125% of the FPL went all of 1996 without insurance (U.S. Census Bureau, 2007).
In 1997, under the Balanced Budget Act, the federal government created the State Chil-
dren’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) to further extend health coverage to uninsured
children. The program was designed to provide coverage to children who are not eligible
for Medicaid and not covered by private insurance (in particular, children in families with
incomes between 100% and 200% of the FPL). The federal government allowed states to set
their income eligibility cutoff up to 200% of the FPL or 50 percentage points above where
their cutoff was on March of 1997 (whichever is higher) while still receiving matching funds.
Although the federal spending on the program was capped at 40 billion dollars over 10 years,
the matching rate was set higher than that under Medicaid.
While the federal government has set the eligibility maximum at 200% for the purposes
of matching funds, each state has the freedom to decide their own eligibility cutoffs based
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on age and a percentage of the FPL. Over time, states have altered their guidelines to cover
more and more families. The uptake and magnitude of these expansions vary greatly by
state. Thus, there is significant variation in the eligibility rules for Medicaid and SCHIP by
state over time.
The federal government allows states some freedom in how they design their SCHIP.
Regarding program structure and implementation, states were given three options: (1) form
a separate program, (2) incorporate it into Medicaid, or (3) implement a combination of the
two. By 2000 all 50 states and the District of Columbia had adopted an SCHIP program:
16 separate, 16 as part of Medicaid, and 19 combinations (Dubay et al., 2002). States
with separate Medicaid and SCHIP programs screen families to see if they are eligible for
Medicaid. By rule, families who are eligible for Medicaid are enrolled into this program
rather than SCHIP. If a state implemented SCHIP as part of Medicaid, they are required to
offer enrollees the same set of benefits they receive under Medicaid. Separate programs are
allowed to vary their benefit packages, although there is a set of minimum benefits required
of all programs. Separate programs are also allowed to apply limited cost sharing measures
to beneficiaries. Therefore, SCHIPs vary in benefits and costs and consequently vary in
attractiveness to potential enrollees.
According to a congressionally-mandated evaluation of the SCHIP initiative (Congres-
sional Budget Office, 2003), the program is having success in reaching the target population,
i.e., poor, uninsured children. 91% of enrollees in 2002 were in families with incomes less
than 200% of the FPL (23% were between 150% and 199%). Furthermore, 43% of enrollees
had no insurance in the six months prior to enrolling. While 28% of enrollees had private
insurance in the six months prior, half of these lost this coverage at some point during this
time and one quarter responded that their coverage was “unaffordable”. Children 0 to 5
years of age made up 19% of the sample while children six to twelve and those older than
13 made up 48% and 33%, respectively. The higher enrollment rates among older children
could be because younger children are eligible at lower incomes and thus are enrolled in
Medicaid. Hispanic, white, and black children made up 49%, 32%, and 12% of the sample,
respectively.
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2.2.2 Related Literature
In the mid-1990s, there were a number of studies that used the variability in Medicaid
expansions across states to examine the impact of public insurance on a wide variety of
health utilization and outcome variables. Since the creation of SCHIP in 1997, there have
been studies that have drawn from and expanded upon the methodologies developed in the
earlier papers to examine this new form of public insurance. In this section I discuss studies
that examine the impact of both Medicaid and SCHIP expansions as they relate to my work.
Prior studies of Medicaid expansion seek to answer two basic questions: (1) What was
the uptake of public health insurance during Medicaid expansion and to what degree did
this crowd out private insurance and (2) Did health care utilization and outcomes among
children increase under Medicaid expansion?
The studies focusing on the latter question have estimated the impact of expansions
on a variety of child health utilization measures. Currie and Gruber (1996) found that
eligibility between 1984 and 1992 was associated with a 9.6 percentage point reduction
in the probability of going 12 months without a visit to a physician (a halving of the
baseline percentage). Two other studies found similar effects for poor black and Hispanic
Medicaid enrollees and for children between 1993 and 1994 with insurance (Racine, 2001;
Newacheck, 1998). Dafny and Gruber (2004) found that a 10 percent increase in eligibility is
associated with an 8.4% increase in hospitalizations. These studies are primarily concerned
with whether expansion led to increased curative utilization. They ignore the role increased
eligibility may have played in changing preventive care in children.
There have been several studies that have looked at Medicaid and its role in preventive
care. Currie and Grogger (2001) examined the impact of various Medicaid policy changes on
adequate prenatal care across different segments of the population from 1990-1996. They
found that increases in the income cutoff for Medicaid eligibility led to increased use of
“adequate” prenatal care among white women, but there was no effect for black women.
Kaestner et al. (2000) examined the impact of ambulatory care sensitive (ACS) hospi-
talizations in children. Their hypothesis is that increased eligibility should lead to better
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primary care among enrollees and that since better primary care has shown to reduce ACS
hospitalizations that increased eligibility should reduce such hospitalizations. The authors
found strong evidence that eligibility decreased the incidence of ACS hospitalizations among
children between 2-6 years of age in “very low income” families. There was little evidence
that Medicaid expansions had an impact on ACS hospitalizations among children of other
ages and incomes. The authors were forced to use median income at the zip code level
rather than individual level data. Thus the claim that they were measuring the impact of
eligibility is dubious.
Currie and Thomas (1996) study the utilization of checkups and physician visits due to
illness by race and insurance type. The authors exploit the longitudinal nature of National
Longitudinal Survey of Children and Mothers (NLSCM) from 1986 and 1988 to control for
unobserved child fixed effects. They found that white children on Medicaid have roughly
15% more check-ups than those with private or no insurance while there is no significant
difference between the numbers of check-ups for black children across all insurance types.
Currie and Thomas (1996) comes closest to this study in terms of its focus on differential
levels of preventive care although they measure the impact of actual enrollment. As the
study uses 1986 and 1988 data only, one cannot comment on the role of policy shifts over
time and evolving eligibility rules on the dependent variables. In addition, this study adds
more preventive care variables, e.g., immunizations, and extends the analysis to SCHIP
coverage.
There is a body of research that has examined the national impact of SCHIP on uti-
lization of care. These papers can be grouped into two broad categories according to the
outcomes they study: (1) access to or utilization of general physician visits and (2) specific
preventive care variables such as immunizations or dental visits.
Papers in the first group tend to focus on having a regular source of care and the occur-
rence of a visit to a general practitioner. They do not distinguish the visits as preventive, i.e.
well child visits or check-ups. Their goal is to measure the impact of SCHIP on the access
to and utilization of general physician visits. In a forthcoming paper by Wang et al., the
authors find that SCHIP availability increases the probability of a visit to a“general doctor”
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in the past 12 months by 7.4%. Furthermore, the impact of SCHIP was amplified as the
length of availability in an area increased. Davidoff (2005) found that among children with
chronic health conditions, eligibility increased the probability of a general physician visit
by 2.4%. In addition, several studies have found that SCHIP eligibility decreases unmet
dental care need and increases the probability of dental visits over the past year (Wang,
2007; Davidoff, 2005). One study found evidence that uninsured children are more likely to
have no preventive dental visits than those with SCHIP or private insurance (Kenney et al.,
2005).
One recent paper directly addresses public health insurance and the likelihood of a
preventive physician visit. Perry and Kenney (2007) find that publicly insured children
are roughly 4 percentage points more likely to have had one preventive visit than full-year
privately insured children and 16.5 percentage points more likely than full-year uninsured
children. The study does not address the endogeneity of insurance choice. The authors
simply report point estimates of the impact of public insurance while controlling for a host
of sociodemographic factors.
Joyce and Racine (2003) measured the impact for children 19 to 36 months of age between
1995 and 2003 living in an area where SCHIP is available and having an income below 200%
of the FPL on being “up-to-date” for certain immunizations. The authors focused on the
difference in impacts between “poor” and “non-poor” children. The only significant impact
was found for varicella vaccinations.
The evidence regarding the impact of Medicaid/SCHIP and race on preventive care
is varied. For instance, while several studies have found evidence that Hispanic and/or
black Americans increased utilization under expansion relative to white Americans (Kenney
et al., 2005; Racine et al., 2001; Congressional Budget Office, 2003; Currie and Thomas,
1995), other studies have found the opposite effect (Currie and Grogger, 2002; Currie and
Gruber, 1996). Public insurance and parental education seem to have a positive impact on
various measures of preventive care (Currie and Grogger, 2002; Currie and Gruber, 1996;
Congressional Budget Office, 2003).
The lack of studies focusing on the effect of public insurance expansion through the
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creation of SCHIP on purely preventive care variables is the most glaring hole in the lit-
erature. Even the studies that use preventive care variables as outcomes group them with
all other types of medical care rather than treating prevention as a separate type of care.
Currie and Gruber (1996) use routine physician check-ups as their measure of utilization
out of convenience simply because it should be unaffected by morbidity unlike most curative
care variables, i.e., curative medical care may decrease under expansion since individuals
are likely to use more preventive care and will therefore be healthier in general.1 In addi-
tion to filling this gap, I will add to the body of SCHIP studies by constructing individual
eligibility using age, income, and state of residence. This methodology has been used in
the past, although the majority of studies simply measure the impact of being poor and
living in an area with an SCHIP program rather than simulating individual eligibility. I
will also add to the work in Joyce and Racine (2003) by including whether immunizations
were administered on time (according to Centers for Disease Control and Prevention - CDC
- recommendations) as a dependent variable as well as if they were up-to-date at the time
of the survey for a wider range of ages (0 to 6 years of age rather than 19 to 36 months).
2.3 Motivation
The goal of this essay is to determine how the aforementioned “eligibility” impacts the
utilization patterns of a crucial component of medical care: well-child physician visits and
immunizations. Routine check-ups are known to minimize the likelihood of developing future
conditions as well as minimizing the damaging effects of current conditions. Foremost among
the long, varied list of conditions are diabetes, asthma, and the host of illnesses prevented
by immunizations. These and other illnesses can disrupt the delicate development of young
children. Thus, the costs of illnesses are generally greater in children than in adults. The
benefits of preventing childhood illnesses are also greater. Among children, those eligible for
public insurance are particularly interesting as they come from relatively low-income homes
that tend to be underinsured compared to the rest of the population.
1This argument ignores the possibility of ex ante moral hazard.
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Childhood immunizations are necessary to protect children from a myriad of infectious
diseases such as diphtheria, polio, measles, and HIB.2 While new borns receive immunity to
certain diseases from their mothers, it lasts only several months. If a child is not vaccinated
at this point and is exposed to one of the preventable diseases, they may become severely ill.
It is also imperative for the efficacy of the immunizations that they be delivered on time and
that children receive all the doses in the series as recommended by the CDC (Appendix A.1).
Strong immunization programs also create a positive externality in which each individual
vaccination reduces the likelihood of contraction for everyone in the community. Although
vaccine preventable diseases are at a record low in the U.S., the viruses and bacteria that
cause them still exist. It is rare that we observe them due to very aggressive immunization
programs and laws. To keep the prevalence of these diseases at the current level, we must
continue the current level of vaccination.
I choose to measure the impact of eligibility rather than actual enrollment. The effects
of eligibility and enrollment on the consumption of preventive care are closely related and
equally interesting, however, they provide us with very different information. Eligibility
is a government policy tool used to control the availability of public health insurance. A
methodology that estimates the impact of eligibility is measuring the effect of state and
federal regulations. Conveniently, eligibility rules vary greatly by by state and age over
time. Although income and state of residence (which determine eligibility) are choices,
many have argued that individual eligibility is a source of exogenous variation (discussed
further in the Methods section). Individual eligibility is certainly very closely related to
enrollment as the decision to enroll is conditional on being eligible. However, enrollment is
a choice by households and individuals that depends on factors other than eligibility. Less
than half of the eligible children in the sample are enrolled in Medicaid or SCHIP.
An important specific goal of this paper is to examine how various subpopulations re-
spond to public health insurance eligibility. Several studies have shown that factors such as
race, ethnicity, and parental education influence the consumption of health care (including
preventive care) in children (Yu, 2002). One proposed explanation for the difference among
2Haemophilus influenzae type b.
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subgroups is variation in health insurance status. Thus, if the gap in health insurance
closes, so too might the gap in utilization. I estimate the differential impact of eligibility
on consumption of preventive care among subgroups to investigate whether or not health
insurance status can explain differences in utilization.
2.3.1 Conceptual Framework
The availability of public health insurance creates incentives to alter preventive medical
care decisions by changing the out-of-pocket cost of both preventive and curative medical
care. First, by providing the option of free (or close to free) care and driving down out-of-
pocket preventive medical costs, public health insurance reduces the negative influence of
preventive care on household budgets. On the other hand, health insurance reduces the cost
of future illnesses by lowering the out-of-pocket cost of curative care. Thus, if individuals
are sufficiently risk neutral, they might be willing to face the risk of future illnesses rather
than invest in prevention in the current period. Public insurance, by changing the cost of
medical care, provides two opposing forces on the consumption of prevention.
Whether individuals increase or decrease utilization when eligible depends largely upon
the probability and severity of illnesses as well as the efficacy of both preventive and cu-
rative medical care in improving health. For instance, if the probability of an illness is
very low or the efficacy of preventive care in lowering the probability of illness is low, the
price incentives created by public health insurance may have little effect on utilization of
prevention. Conversely, if the probability of illness is very high, then even a very small price
incentive may have a large impact on utilization. Similarly, the relative efficacy of preventive
and curative medical care in improving health will determine how the price incentives of
health insurance influence utilization. If preventive medical care has a large positive impact
on health, then insurance should provide a strong incentive to consume more prevention.
However, if curative care is particularly effective in increasing health but the out-of-pocket
costs relatively high, then public health insurance might provide a strong incentive to incur
the risk of future illnesses rather than consuming preventive care in the current period. In
this case, preventive care, is in a sense an inferior good.
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The availability of public health insurance decreases the out-of-pocket costs for routine
checkups and other prevention related visits. Medicaid and SCHIP plans in all 50 states
cover at least one well-child physician visit per year. Thus, one would expect that preventive
visits would increase among those with no insurance and no chance of public coverage, in
which all costs are out of pocket, when public insurance is made available. Preventive
physician visits might also increase among those with private insurance under increased
eligibility as they would pay lower or no premiums and co-payments under Medicaid or
SCHIP. This impact could be dampened in states where the SCHIP has a cost sharing
component as the potential savings of public insurance are partially eroded by the premiums
attached to these programs.
The role of public health insurance eligibility in the consumption of childhood immu-
nizations is less clear. Basic immunizations are funded for all Medicaid, uninsured, and
underinsured (those with private insurance that does not cover immunizations) children un-
der the Vaccinations for Children Program (VCP). Age eligible children can receive CDC
recommended immunizations at any registered VCP provider for an administration fee which
ranges from 10 to 15 dollars. According to the CDC, “most” pediatricians as well as many
family practice providers, general practitioners, and sub-specialty health care providers are
enrolled in the VCP (over 50,000 enrollees nationwide).3 Thus, there is no out-of-pocket cost
savings for those receiving Medicaid or SCHIP benefits (save the administration fee each
visit) and little incentive to alter utilization of immunizations. Another potential limitation
of the role of public health insurance in the consumption of immunizations is that there is
little variation in whether a child has received at least one dose of a vaccination. With the
exception of Varicella4, over 80% of the sample received at least one dose of each of the
other five shots (Appendix A.2)5 - consistent across eligibility and enrollment status (Tables
3There is no mention of whether there are fewer registered providers in traditionally under served areas.
This would allow public health insurance a larger role in increasing utilization of immunizations in these
areas.
4The rate of utilization of the varicella vaccine is lower than the other immunizations and is increasing
rapidly over the course of this study because it was not approved by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) until 1995.
5The rate is over 90% if the parent provided the information.
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2.1 and 2.2).
However, there is significant variation by eligibility and enrollment in the percentage of
children whose immunizations are up-to-date and whether or not they were administered on
time (Tables 2.1 and 2.2) according to CDC recommendations. Eligibility could have a sig-
nificant positive effect on the timing and completeness of immunization series by increasing
regular child contact with physicians and awareness rather than through price.
Preventive care could potentially decline due to the increased availability of public health
insurance, i.e., the ex ante moral hazard problem. According to the ex ante moral hazard
dilemma, people engage in riskier behavior when they are insulated from the consequences
of a negative outcome. In health terms, people reduce healthy behaviors (preventive care)
when they have access to health insurance and can therefore afford treatment (curative care)
when they become sick.
Given the ex ante moral hazard problem, preventive and curative care are types of
substitutes. Individuals substitute healthy behaviors today for a procedure or treatment
tomorrow once they are ill. If we can assume that most parents do not “gamble” with
their child’s health and that the price incentives are strong enough, the ex ante moral
hazard problem should not be a concern. Furthermore, there are no effective sources of
curative care for the diseases prevented by immunizations. Ex ante moral hazard is more
of a consideration for non-medical preventive care such as diet, exercise, and general health
behaviors in adults.
2.4 Data
2.4.1 Data Source and Study Population
Individual level data are obtained from the 1997-2003 waves of the National Health Inter-
view Survey (NHIS). The NHIS is an annual survey of the health of the non-institutionalized
population of the U.S. conducted by the National Center for Health Statistics under the
CDC. Each year a new set of households from across the U.S. take part in the survey. The
survey contains of a core set of questions asked of each member of the household. In addition
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to the core component, one sample child and one adult are chosen at random to answer an
additional set of health related questions. The sampled children also take part in a sepa-
rate immunization module. However, most of the questions in the immunization module
are asked only of sampled children 0-7 years of age. Thus, the sample for the vaccination
analysis is restricted to children 0-7 years of age. The core and sample questionnaires are
redesigned every fifteen years. The most recent changes were made in 1997.
The estimation sample includes all children 0 to 18 years of age selected to participate in
the sample child survey (with the exception of the immunization models which, as mentioned
previously, include only children 0-7 years of age). I begin the sample in 1997 because the
questionnaire was redesigned at this time. The 1997 version includes additional questions
about preventive physician visits as well as a more comprehensive set of immunizations.
Even though NHIS data is available for 2004 and 2005, I chose to end the sample in 2003
because the waves after this point do not include the immunization component other than
several questions about the influenza vaccine. Thus, the variables used in this study are
reported consistently in the NHIS surveys from 1997 to 2003.
The entire NHIS sample from 1997 to 2003 contains 686,233 individuals, 193,980 of which
are children. Of those children, 100,402 were randomly selected to take part in the sample
child and immunization modules (roughly 14,000 in each year). The NHIS reports immu-
nization data for each participating child from one of two different sources. The information
is either taken from a vaccination card or provided by the child’s parent/guardian. Of the
children participating in the immunization module, 26% had immunization records. The
immunization questions were answered by a parent for the remaining 74% of the sample.
A study of vaccination cards versus medical records showed that in general, cards ap-
proximated the actual records quite well (Fierman et al., 1996). Suarez (1997) found that
parental recall was not a very reliable approximation of immunizations on medical records.
Parents tended to under report vaccinations. However, the authors found that the combi-
nation of parental recall and immunizations cards were accurate predictors of vaccinations.
The studies report that the ability to accurately recall immunizations did not vary by race,
education, or health insurance.
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In the NHIS sample, the percentage of children up-to-date and having ever received a
vaccine are much higher (for all immunizations) when a parent reported the information
(Appendix A.2). Since the survey only reports immunizations from one source for each
child, I cannot determine whether the parents over report or the vaccination cards under
represent the percentage of children receiving shots. If we trust the vaccine cards, then it
appears that parents are over reporting immunizations. Conversely, the immunization cards
could be missing information. This is unlikely, however, as the survey allows parents to fill in
any shots missing from the cards. The samples are similar in observable sociodemographic
traits with several slight differences (Table 2.3). For example, the percentage of children
with immunization cards is slightly higher among those of Hispanic origin and those living in
the Midwest and West. I separate the sample into two groups, children with immunization
records and those with information provided by parents, and run the analysis on each sample
separately.
2.4.2 Measurement of Key Variables
The dependent variables fall into two categories, preventive physician visits and child-
hood immunizations. The first group includes the following variables indicating whether or
not the child: (1) has had a preventive check-up in the past 12 months, (2) has had any
physician visit in the past 12 months, (3) has a usual place for preventive care, (4) has a
physician’s office as a usual source of preventive care, (5) has a usual place for general care,
and (6) has a physician’s office as a usual source of general care.
The immunizations included in the sample are: (1) Diphtheria, Tetanus, Pertussis
(DPaT), (2) Polio, (3) Measles, Mumps, Rubella (MMR), (4) Haemophilus influenzae type
b (HIB), and (5) Varicella (chicken pox). There are three potential ways to measure the
consumption of these vaccinations in children. The first is whether a child has ever received
a shot as the measure of a vaccination. The second measure is if a child is up-to-date for
each immunization separately at the time of the survey, according to the official recommen-
dations of the CDC (Appendix A.1). I am able to determine each child’s status using their
age at the time of the survey and the count of each type of immunization. The last metric
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is whether a child received the immunization by the recommended date, again per CDC
recommendations. I am able to determine timeliness of vaccinations using the age of the
child and the date of each vaccination for those children that a shot record is present.
I use information in the NHIS along with state level Medicaid and SCHIP eligibility
rules to construct a measure of eligibility for every child in the sample. Individual eligibility
is determined by the state of residence, income as a percentage of the federal poverty level
(FPL), and the age of the child. States set eligibility cutoffs for each age group based on
family income as a percentage of the FPL. Although state identifiers are censored in the
NHIS public use files and income information is coded into broadly defined groups to protect
the identities of the respondents, I have gained access to the unrestricted data so that I can
construct the necessary eligibility variable. The maximum income level as a percentage of
FPL for infants varies greatly by state from 1997 to 2003. By 2000, children aged 0-18 are
covered at some level in every state. However, the level of coverage still varies from state to
state. Furthermore, there is variation in the maximum income as a percentage of FPL by
age groups within states in a given year.
The right-hand-side variables included in the various models are summarized in Ap-
pendices C and D. The explanatory variables were all taken from the core component of
the NHIS. The variables control for individual, parental, and family level sociodemographic
traits. The composition of the sample has remained uniform from 1997-2003 with a few
exceptions. Private insurance has declined somewhat while Medicaid has risen from 18%
in 1997 to over 20% in 2003. SCHIP coverage rose from roughly 1% in 1999 to almost 6%
in 2003. Not surprisingly, the percentage of children eligible for either Medicaid or SCHIP
rose dramatically from 1997 to 2003 due to increasingly generous eligibility rules. The rise
is particularly noticable in 1998 and 1999 when many states adopted maximum %FPLs of
200 and above.
Appendices E and B summarize utilization of preventive physician visits and immu-
nizations by year, respectively. Utilization is consistently high for all the preventive visit
variables (Appendix A.5). Similarly, immunization rates when reported by parents and “any
recorded shots” taken from the vaccine cards are very high with little variation over time
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(Appendix A.2)6. However, the proportions of children receiving vaccinations on time have
increased over time for each type of immunization.
Tables 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 report the utilization of preventive care variables by public health
insurance eligibility and by enrollment status for children not enrolled in a private insurance
plan. The utilization rates of physician based preventive care are higher for those eligible for
public health insurance (Table 2.4 - top panel). The percentage of children eligible for either
Medicaid or SCHIP with a routine well-child checkup in the previous 12 months is almost
4 percentage points higher than those not eligible for public insurance. The differences are
even greater between those enrolled and not enrolled in Medicaid or SCHIP (Table 2.4 -
bottom panel). Surprisingly, children eligible for public health insurance are slightly less
likely to have had immunizations - with the exception of the varicella vaccine7 (Table 2.2).
However, those actually enrolled in either Medicaid or SCHIP are more likely to be up-to-
date and have had their immunizations on time - particularly when reported on a vaccination
card (Table 2.3).
Table 2.5 reports the differences in utilization of a subset of the preventive care variables
by race, Hispanic origin, U.S. birth, and maternal education (a subset of the covariates).
In general, children of Hispanic origin, born outside the U.S., and those with mother’s of
low educational attainment had lower levels of preventive care consumption. Utilization by
race depends on the type of care. Black children were more likely to have had a routine
checkup over the past 12 months and a usual source of preventive care. White children were
more likely to have a physician as their usual source of preventive care and receive their
immunizations on time.
Table 2.6 shows how the selected subgroups vary by public health insurance for routine
checkups. The bold figures can be interpreted as the difference in how subgroups differ
by public health insurance status in the consumption of preventive care. For example,
the difference in utilization of routine check-ups between those eligible and non-eligible is
6The only exception is the Varicella vaccine which was only approved in 1995.
7One previous study found a positive impact of eligibility on varicella but not other vaccines. The
rationalization for the impact is that there is room for improvement for the up-take of the varicella vaccination
while the utilization of the other recommended immunizations is near 100%
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greater for those born in the U.S. and for those with lower levels of maternal education. The
differences for white children and those of Hispanic origin were only slightly greater than
the comparison groups. This provides a small amount of evidence that these groups react
more to the incentives provided by public health insurance eligibility. To be convinced, we
must control for a host of confounding variables such as income/poverty, age, and family
size.
2.5 Methods
I estimate a linear probability model8 of preventive medical care utilization among chil-
dren. I exploit the state and age variation in Medicaid and SCHIP eligibility over time
to estimate the impact of eligibility on preventive care. There is significant variation in
the income cutoffs by state and age over time. Thus, public health insurance eligibility is
primarily determined by state legislative environments rather than individual and family
choices. I run all models with actual enrollment in Medicaid/SCHIP from the NHIS as a
comparison to the results with eligibility. The basic specification is:
Rit = β0 +β1Iit +β′2Xit +β
′
3Yit +β
′
4Cst +β5Pit + δs + θt +αi +αi× δs +αi× θt + it (2.1)
R: whether or not the child utilized the preventive care
I: Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility
X: a vector of individual and family characteristics (gender, race, ethnicity, U.S. birth,
income, maternal education, number of family members)
Y: select covariates interacted with eligibility
C: state plan characteristics by year
P: whether or not the child is covered by private insurance δ: State dummies
θ: year dummies
8I estimate a linear probability model for ease of computation, particularly in estimating and interpreting
interaction terms, and for consistency in the 2SLS estimations.
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α: age group dummies
Iit denotes eligibility for either Medicaid or SCHIP9. The preventive care variables (listed
in Tables 2.1 and 2.5), Rit, measure preventive physician visits and immunization utilization.
I control for child and family traits that determine Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility (income and
the age of the child) as well as exogenous factors that might affect utilization (gender,
race, ethnicity, U.S. birth, family size, and maternal education). I also control for a state
Medicaid/SCHIP plan characteristics that might influence individual choice to consume
preventive care - foremost of which are whether the plan has a cost sharing component and
whether Medicaid and SCHIP are joint or separate programs.
Even when using eligibility rather than insurance choice, there are still several estima-
tion issues: (1) there are possible omitted group level unobservables that influence both
Medicaid eligibility and utilization of preventive care, and (2) individual eligibility is poten-
tially endogenous, e.g., sick children that require more preventive care may reduce parental
income leading to a spurious positive relationship between eligibility and utilization. I in-
clude self-reported health status as an initial attempt to control for the preexisting health
stock of children. However, the reliability of self reported health is highly dubious as a true
measure of health and very few parents responded that their child was in either of the lower
two health categories, fair or poor (Appendix A.3).
There may be state and age group unobservables that impact both preventive medical
care utilization as well as Medicaid eligibility rules (problem 1 discussed above). For in-
stance, relatively wealthy states may have both more generous Medicaid policies and higher
medical care utilization (Currie and Gruber 1996). To account for omitted variable bias, I
include state (δ), time (θ), and age (α) dummies. To control for any differences in utilization
across age groups over time and age groups within states I include interactions between age
and year as well as age and state. Thus, the identification comes from changes in eligibility
within states over time, and changes within age groups in states over time.
9In states with separate Medicaid and SCHIP programs, SCHIP will provide coverage to many low income
families that do not meet the eligibility criteria for Medicaid. States attempt to ensure that any children
eligible for Medicaid are enrolled in that program rather than SCHIP.
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In order to account for the individual level endogeneity bias outlined above (issue 2),
I instrument child eligibility with a state level Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility metric. By in-
strumenting state level eligibility by age and year for each child, I purge the analysis of
any individual level omitted variable bias, i.e., variables that influence both utilization and
eligibility. However, as with the Currie and Gruber 1996 study, the NHIS does not have
enough observations to construct an eligibility rate for each state/year/age combination. To
create a large enough sample, I first extract a random sample of 300 children for each year
and age group combination (300*7*18). I then apply each state’s eligibility criteria to this
nationally representative sample yielding 51 different versions of individual eligibility. Using
this sample, I calculate a state level eligibility rate for each state/age/year combination. I
assign the single appropriate state/age/year instrument to each child. This metric has the
added benefit of varying only by the “legislative environment” in each state rather than by
the state and time economic conditions that might affect both eligibility and consumption
of preventive care.
2.6 Results
Table 2.7 presents estimates for the impact of both eligibility for and enrollment in
public health insurance programs (Medicaid and SCHIP) on the utilization of six measures
of routine medical care. The second and third columns report the impact of eligibility
using a linear probability model estimated by OLS and a 2SLS approach with individual
eligibility instrumented by a simulated group eligibility rate. Without the instruments,
eligibility is associated with a 4.0 percentage point increase in the likelihood of having a
routine check-up in the last 12 months and a 1.9 percentage point increase in any visit to
a health professional in the last 12 months. These changes are 13.3% and 14.8% increases
over the baseline percentages for those eligble for public insurance but without any visits
over the past 12 months. The results in column two also suggest that eligibility increases
the likelihood of having a usual source of general care and preventive care by 1.3 and 0.8
percentage points, respectively. These may seem like modest changes, however they are
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11.6% and 10.7% increases over the baseline for those eligible but without a usual source of
care. There is no evidence that eligibility increases the likelihood that a child’s usual source
of care is a physician’s office.
Estimates using individual level eligibility could potentially be biased upwards or down-
wards, i.e., sick children with high levels of utilization could create enough of a financial
burden so that the family becomes eligible or conversely, there could be unobserved traits
that increase the probability that a child is eligible that also make them less likely to con-
sume preventive medical care. The 2SLS results in column 3 suggest that the estimates
in column 2 are, in fact, biased downward. Eligibility is now associated with 13.9 and 9.9
percentage point increases in the likelihood of having a routine checkup or any physician
visit over the past 12 months, respectively (46.3% and 76.9% increases over the baseline
percentages). Eligibility is associated with 4.3 and 2.0 percentage point increases in the
likelihood that a child has a usual source of general and preventive care, respectively (36.1%
and 26.8% increases over the baseline percentages). Thus, when instrumenting for indivual
level eligibility using a simulated group rate, I find that eligibility increases the likelihood
that children will consume preventive medical care by 25% to 75% depending on the mea-
sure of prevention. As in column two, eligibility does not have an impact on the likelihood
of having a physician as a usual source of care10.
Column 1 contains the point estimates for the effect of actual enrollment on utilization
of preventive medical care as a comparison to columns 2 and 3. The effects of enrollment
on the probabilities of a routine check-up and any physician visit are very similar to the
impacts of eligibility. This provides some evidence that there is little difference between
10I include the simulated age/state/year group eligibililty rates as well as the interactions between the
rates and time as instruments for individual level eligibility in the first stage. The instruments perform
extremely well in predicting individual level eligibility. The coefficients for group eligibility and eligibility-
time interactions are large and precisely measured. The partial R squared value is 0.051 and thus, the
instruments explain a relatively large percentage of the variance in individual eligibility. The F statistic is
large enough to reject the null that the regressors are not jointly significant at the 1% level. I ran tests
of the overidentifying restrictions using a Sargan statistic, which has a Chi-squared distribution with the
number of degress of freedom equal to the number of instruments minus the number of regressors. The test
checks whether the instruments can be excluded from the 2nd stage equation. The null hypothesis is that
the instruments can in fact be excluded from the 2nd stage equation and thus are valid. The test did not
reject at the 15% significance level. There is therefore, some weak evidence that simulated eligibility can be
excluded from the main equation. For each dependent variable, I can reject the null hypothesis at the 1%
level that the OLS and 2SLS estimates are equal using a Hausman statistic.
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being eligible for and enrolling in public health insurance when it comes to a single routine
visit. However, the effect of enrollment on the probabilities of a usual source of preventive
care and having a physician as a usual source of preventive care are much larger. This
suggests that there are some other unobserved factors mediating the decision to enroll other
than simply being eligible.
Table 2.8 provides estimates of the impact of eligibility and enrollment on the utilization
of immunizations for children 0-6 years of age, i.e. whether a child has ever had one of six
shots, whether they are up-to-date, and whether the shots were administered on time. Table
2.9 provides the same information, however, the source of the immunization information
is the parent rather than an official vaccination health card. Eligibility has no effect on
the utilization of immunizations with the exception of DTP and polio vaccinations when
reported by a parent (Table 2.9). When reported by a parent, eligibility increases the
probability that a child has had and is up-to-date for the DTP and polio series by roughly
1-2 percentage points. These changes represent 50% and 20% increases over the baseline
percentages for having had any shots and whether they are up-to-date respectively.
The 2SLS results in column 3 report a strong negative relationship between eligibility
and the consumption of immunizations. The negative relationship suggests that there is
some unobserved factor associated with eligibility that also decreases the likelihood of im-
munizations. Enrollment does not demonstrate the same negative trend. Column 1 provides
evidence that enrollment increases the probability that a child is up-to-date for and received
the DTP, polio, and HIB immunizations on time, but no effect on consumption of the other
vaccines. As mentioned previously, enrollment has a strong positive effect on the probability
of having a usual source of routine care at a physician’s office while eligibility does not. A
regular source of care at a physician’s office could increase the likelihood that a child is
up-to-date and on time regarding vaccinations. A usual source of care could be acting as
a mediator between eligibility and enrollment to explain the positive effect of enrollment.
Without this extra push from enrollment and a physician’s office as a usual source of care,
the effect of eligibility alone could have no effect or even a negative effect on utilization since
public health insurance availability provides a weak price incentive for immunizations (they
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are provided free to everyone regardless of insurance status)11.
The signs of the coefficients on the covariates are listed in Table 2.10. In general the
covariates were precisely measured and consistent, with regard to sign, across all specifica-
tions and dependent variables. Older children and those in larger families were much less
likely to consume preventive medical care. Younger children are more likely to have routine
care simply because they are targeted by health professionals for regular well-child check-
ups. The lower utilization rate in larger families is most likely due to the negative influence
of health care on household budgets. For the majority of the dependent variables, gender
did not affect utilization. Occasionally male children were slightly more likely to consume
preventive care.
Race plays a varying role in the utilization of preventive medical care. Black children
and those neither black or white were several percentage points more likely to have had
a routine check-up over the past 12 months and have a usual source of preventive care.
Conversely, white children were more likely to have seen a health professional in the last 12
months, have a usual source of care, and have a physician’s office as a source of general and
preventive care. It appears that black families are more likely to consume routine check-ups,
controlling for other factors, but less likely to have a physician as source of preventive care.
Children born outside the U.S. and those of Hispanic origin were less likely to consume care.
The effect is particularly strong for those born outside the U.S., i.e., 10-20% points lower for
most measures of preventive care. While those born outside the U.S. are a small percentage
of the total population, they have very low utilization rates for the preventive care variables
addressed in this study.
Higher levels of maternal education and income were associated with increased utilization
of preventive care. Parental education and income are other possible important reasons for
11The first stage in the 2SLS analysis is necessarily different with immunizations as the dependent variables
since the sample is children 0-6 years of age rather than 0-18. The instruments do not perform quite as well in
predicting individual level eligibility. The coefficients for group eligibility and eligibility-time interactions are
smaller, although they are still strong, significant predictors of individual eligibility. The partial R squared
value is 0.019 and the F-statistic is large enough to reject the null that the regressors are not jointly significant
at the 1% level. The test of the overidentifying restriction did not reject at the 30% significance level. Thus,
there is evidence that simulated eligibility can be excluded from the main equation. For each dependent
variable (with the exception of MMR in Table 2.9), I can reject the null hypothesis at the 1% level that the
OLS and 2SLS estimates are equal using a Hausman statistic.
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the lack in take-up of health insurance in the U.S. Even among those eligible for public
health insurance, education and income still have strong positive effects on utilization. The
positive effect of income is proof that there are still time and travel costs associated with free
health care that make families with slightly higher incomes more likely to take advantage
of preventive care.
Tables 2.11 and 2.12 contain the coefficients for the interaction effects of eligibility and
covariates on two select measures of preventive care - routine check-ups over the past 12
months and usual source of preventive care. The point estimates can be interpreted as
the effect that eligibility has among the given group compared to the omitted group, i.e.,
the relative degree to which the given group takes advantage of eligibility with regard to
an increase in prevention. Eligibility increases the probability of having a usual source of
preventive care for black children by 7.3 percentage points more than the increase for white
children (Table 2.12). Eligibility increases the likelihood of both a routine check-up and
a usual source of care by 6.7 and 12.2 more percentage points, respectively, for children
neither black or white over white children. Evidence in Table 2.11 suggests that eligibility
among Hispanic children and those born outside the U.S. does not impact the probability of
a routine check-up as much as it does for their counterparts (6.9 and 12.0 percentage points
less for Hispanic children and those born outside the U.S., respectively).
A surprising result is that the increase in the likelihood that a child has a usual source
of preventive care from eligibility is lower among children whose mothers have higher levels
of education (Table 2.12). In other words, mothers with lower levels of education tend
to take advantage of the incentives provided by public health insurance availability to a
greater extent than more educated mothers. The proportion of children of highly educated
mothers with a usual source of preventive care is over 90% for both those eligible and not
eligible for public insurance. It is likely that there is some unobserved trait in the small
percentage of highly educated mothers without a source of preventive care for their child
that increases the probability of being eligible but lowers the likelihood of utilization. There
is no differential impact of education on eligibility by maternal education for the likelihood
of a routine check-up over the past 12 months (Table 2.11).
60
2.7 Discussion
In this paper, I focus on the effect of recent expansions in public health insurance eli-
gibility on preventive medical care. I investigate how eligibility, a policy tool controlled by
state governments, influences utilization rather than actual enrollment which is conditional
on eligibility but relies on individual choice. Thus, the impact examined in this paper is
that of the option of health insurance rather than actually having health insurance. This is
a subtle but key difference. I use individual level data and detailed state eligibility criteria
to assign eligibility as accurately as possible. Thus I am measuring the actual effect of
eligibility rather than, as in some studies, the impact of having a low income in a state and
time with generous eligibility criteria.
The findings are within the range of effects found in studies that focus on measures of cu-
rative care utilization. The literature finds that eligibility (both recent and earlier Medicaid
expansion in the 1980’s and 1990’s) increases certain measures of curative care consumption
from several to over ten percentage points with large jumps in the baseline percentages for
those without care. Furthermore, this study supports one of the general findings in Joyce
and Racine (2003), i.e., that eligibility has little or no effect on immunizations.
Because certain subpopulations have lower rates of both utilization (Table 2.5) and
insurance coverage , it is important to investigate whether eligibility closes or widens this
gap. I find that in most cases, eligibility perpetuates the differences in utilization, i.e., those
with higher levels of care in the general population tend to also take advantage of eligibility
to a greater extent. The best illustration of this behavior is in the difference between
those born in and outside of the U.S. Those born inside the U.S. are much more likely to
increase their preventive behaviors when made eligible for public insurance. If the incentives
provided by public health insurance are not enough to induce changes in preventive medical
care consumption for certain groups (and the behavior change is deemed a worthwhile goal),
then is important to investigate what barriers remain.
Utilization of the preventive behaviors discussed in this paper will never approach 100%,
even under universal eligibility for health insurance. There are other barriers to consumption
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such as education and time/travel costs that are not solved by free or near free health
insurance. Once the usefullness of eligibility in increasing consumption has been exhausted
policy makers must explore these additional barriers to gain any increases in utilization.
However, before they do so, they must address whether or not the benefit of the increase in
utilization is worth investing the necessary resources. For instance, how great is the benefit
of increasing the percentage of children with a yearly routine physician’s visit from 90%
to 95%? In addition, individuals value future health differently and have varying priorties
for how they allocate thier resources to items such as food, education, and health care.
The effect of eligibility for public insurance on medical prevention is compelling only if
the lack of insurance is a real barrier to to behaviors that promote good health. I argue
that routine well-child check-ups and a usual source of care improve the health stock of
children by identifying current conditions and reducing the likelihood of future illnesses.
Furthermore, I provide strong evidence that eligibility for Medicaid and SCHIP creates
an incentive for families to increase routine care. Childhood immunizations are similarly
important to individual and public health, however, it appears that eligibility is not enough
of an incentive to induce the small percentage of those not receiving the recommended
vaccinations to change their behaviors.
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Table 2.1: Dependent variables (immunization means), by eligibility and source of informa-
tion for children 0-7 years of age
Variable full sample eligible not eligible difference
Data source: health card
observations 12,932 5,719* 5,719* 5,719*
any recorded shots
DTP 92.55 91.10 94.17 -3.07
polio 89.59 87.79 90.23 -2.44
varicella 27.79 30.38 24.23 6.15
MMR 80.58 75.66 81.03 -4.36
HIB 85.31 83.70 85.48 -1.78
up-to-date
DTP 78.28 76.68 77.97 -1.29
polio 77.66 76.57 76.70 -0.13
varicella 31.23 35.56 27.54 8.02
MMR 90.59 88.39 91.68 -3.29
HIB 57.17 54.74 56.46 -1.72
received on time
DTP 44.95 39.16 42.57 -3.41
polio 53.02 48.19 50.21 -2.02
varicella 17.96 20.54 15.89 4.65
MMR 63.52 58.94 59.67 -0.73
HIB 30.15 26.53 28.89 -2.36
Data source: parent/guardian
observations 23,558 9,330* 9,330* 9,330*
any recorded shots
DTP 98.40 98.19 97.98 0.21
polio 96.44 95.96 95.52 0.44
varicella 47.66 55.19 46.28 8.91
MMR 96.96 95.88 97.06 -1.18
HIB 90.77 90.26 89.29 0.97
up-to-date
DTP 91.59 90.80 91.68 -0.88
polio 90.85 89.47 90.36 -0.89
varicella 44.79 52.00 42.96 9.04
MMR 96.57 95.26 96.62 -1.36
HIB 83.16 81.54 82.86 1.32
Note: For columns two and three, the sample is those without a source of private health insurance.
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Table 2.2: Dependent variables (immunization means), by enrollment (Medicaid or SCHIP)
and source of information for children 0-7 years of age
Variable full sample enrolled not enrolled eligible-non eligible
Data source: health card
observations 12,932 5,719 5,719 5,719
any recorded shots
DTP 92.55 91.17 94.08 -2.91
polio 89.59 88.59 90.07 -1.48
varicella 27.79 30.91 26.47 4.44
MMR 80.58 75.61 82.84 -7.23
HIB 85.31 85.02 83.28 1.74
up-to-date
DTP 78.28 77.79 76.04 1.75
polio 77.66 78.92 77.08 1.84
varicella 31.23 36.99 28.95 8.04
MMR 90.59 89.86 90.54 -0.68
HIB 57.17 57.75 49.65 8.10
received on time
DTP 44.95 42.29 38.83 3.46
polio 53.02 50.77 51.32 -0.55
varicella 17.96 21.72 15.49 6.23
MMR 63.52 63.24 59.31 3.93
HIB 30.15 29.16 24.36 4.80
Data source: parent/guardian
observations 23,558 9,330 9,330 9,330
any recorded shots
DTP 98.40 98.10 98.28 -0.18
polio 96.44 95.71 96.88 -1.17
varicella 47.66 57.75 52.40 5.35
MMR 96.96 95.43 97.26 -1.83
HIB 90.77 29.16 24.36 4.80
up-to-date
DTP 91.59 91.74 91.66 0.08
polio 90.85 90.41 91.11 -0.70
varicella 44.79 54.77 49.21 5.56
MMR 96.57 94.81 96.85 -2.04
HIB 83.16 83.43 83.59 -0.16
Note: For columns two and three, the sample is those without a source of private health insurance.
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Table 2.3: Explanatory variables by source of immunization data for children 0-7 years of
age
Variable card parent difference
Gender
male 51.06 51.66 0.60
female 48.94 48.34 -0.60
Race
white 74.69 73.02 -1.67 ***
black 13.19 17.56 4.37 ***
other 12.12 9.42 -2.70 ***
Hispanic origin 31.57 25.30 -6.27 ***
Born in U.S. 94.20 94.28 0.08
Family size
two 7.38 8.87 1.49 ***
three 29.82 29.19 -0.63
four 34.75 34.14 -0.61
five 17.31 17.15 -0.16
> five 10.74 10.65 -0.09
Mother’s education
no high school degree 22.29 19.39 -2.90 ***
high school degree 25.88 29.57 3.69 ***
some college 30.24 30.46 0.22
BA/BS 15.66 14.60 -1.06 ***
advanced degree 5.93 5.98 0.05
Family income
$0-20,000 23.01 21.18 -1.83 ***
$20,000-$35,000 20.86 19.60 -1.26 ***
$35,000-$50,000 21.86 21.38 -0.48
$50,000-$75,000 14.42 15.39 0.97 ***
over $75,000 19.85 22.25 2.40 ***
Parent reported health status
excellent 56.42 52.73 3.69 ***
very good 26.97 29.08 -2.11 ***
good 14.62 16.16 -1.54 ***
fair 1.73 1.76 -0.03
poor 0.26 0.26 0.00
∗∗∗indicates significance at the 1% level.
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Table 2.4: Dependent variables (preventive physician visit means), by eligibility and enroll-
ment (Medicaid or SCHIP) for children 0-18 years of age
Variable full sample eligible not eligible difference
routine checkup last 12 months 72.18 70.02 66.32 3.70
seen health professional last 12m 88.96 87.14 84.72 2.42
usual source of care 93.30 88.82 87.80 1.02
usual source is a physician’s office 76.46 58.23 64.48 -4.25
usual source of preventive care 95.74 92.55 91.61 0.94
usual source is a physician’s office 75.57 57.13 63.63 -6.50
Variable full sample enrolled not enrolled difference
routine checkup last 12 months 72.18 76.76 57.16 19.60
seen health professional last 12m 88.96 92.10 76.81 15.29
usual source of care 93.30 95.49 76.88 18.61
usual source is a physician’s office 76.46 61.07 51.93 9.14
usual source of preventive care 95.74 97.55 82.97 14.58
usual source is a physician’s office 75.57 60.63 50.05 10.58
Note: For columns two and three, the sample is those without a source of private health insurance.
66
T
ab
le
2.
5:
Su
bs
et
of
de
pe
nd
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
s,
by
se
le
ct
ed
ex
pl
an
at
or
y
va
ri
ab
le
s
V
ac
ci
ne
re
ce
iv
ed
on
ti
m
e
R
ou
ti
ne
ch
ec
ku
p
U
su
al
so
ur
ce
of
U
su
al
so
ur
ce
is
a
E
xp
la
na
to
ry
va
ri
ab
le
s
la
st
12
m
on
th
s
pr
ev
en
ti
ve
ca
re
ph
ys
ic
ia
n’
s
offi
ce
D
T
P
po
lio
va
ri
ce
lla
M
M
R
H
IB
R
ac
e
w
hi
te
70
.9
3
95
.7
3
77
.9
8
46
.6
5
54
.7
2
17
.8
7
64
.9
1
31
.6
9
bl
ac
k
77
.7
2
96
.7
9
69
.5
4
36
.0
5
43
.5
8
17
.9
8
54
.6
6
22
.5
7
ot
he
r
72
.3
6
93
.9
3
66
.9
5
44
.3
2
52
.9
4
18
.5
6
64
.6
8
28
.9
9
d
iff
er
en
ce
(w
h
it
e-
b
la
ck
)
-6
.7
9
-1
.0
6
8.
44
10
.6
0
11
.1
4
-0
.1
1
10
.2
5
9.
12
d
iff
er
en
ce
(w
h
it
e-
ot
h
er
)
-1
.4
3
1.
80
11
.0
3
2.
33
1.
78
-0
.6
9
0.
23
2.
70
d
iff
er
en
ce
(b
la
ck
-o
th
er
)
5.
36
2.
86
2.
59
-8
.2
7
-9
.3
6
-0
.5
8
-1
0.
02
-6
.4
2
H
is
pa
ni
c
or
ig
in
ye
s
67
.0
7
91
.0
3
64
.0
5
42
.2
0
53
.7
0
19
.6
2
63
.6
9
27
.7
0
no
74
.0
7
97
.4
8
79
.5
5
46
.3
7
52
.6
5
17
.2
0
63
.4
4
31
.4
2
d
iff
er
en
ce
(y
es
-n
o)
-7
.0
0
-6
.4
5
-1
5.
50
-4
.1
7
1.
05
2.
42
0.
25
-3
.7
2
B
or
n
in
U
.S
.
ye
s
73
.1
9
96
.6
9
76
.5
5
45
.7
7
53
.1
6
18
.5
5
64
.9
7
31
.1
0
no
55
.6
8
80
.1
6
56
.2
5
23
.9
4
49
.2
6
9.
54
42
.7
1
5.
93
d
iff
er
en
ce
(y
es
-n
o)
17
.5
1
16
.5
3
20
.3
0
21
.8
3
3.
90
9.
01
22
.2
6
25
.1
7
M
ot
he
r’
s
ed
uc
at
io
n
no
hi
gh
sc
ho
ol
de
gr
ee
63
.2
6
90
.0
6
57
.8
3
38
.5
6
48
.2
7
17
.3
1
59
.4
1
24
.9
7
hi
gh
sc
ho
ol
de
gr
ee
70
.7
7
96
.5
4
75
.6
0
43
.0
5
50
.9
7
15
.8
5
61
.6
4
27
.7
0
so
m
e
co
lle
ge
75
.6
8
97
.6
9
80
.1
7
47
.5
9
56
.6
0
18
.6
7
64
.4
9
32
.5
0
B
A
/B
S
78
.8
8
98
.6
5
86
.5
0
52
.9
2
57
.2
7
21
.7
7
71
.7
2
36
.4
8
ad
va
nc
ed
de
gr
ee
82
.9
0
98
.9
6
89
.1
6
54
.4
3
59
.3
7
21
.0
8
73
.8
1
39
.6
0
d
iff
er
en
ce
(H
S
-N
o
H
S
d
eg
)
-7
.5
1
-6
.4
8
-1
7.
77
-4
.4
9
-2
.7
0
1.
46
-2
.2
3
-2
.7
3
d
iff
er
en
ce
(B
A
/B
S
-H
S
d
eg
)
-8
.1
1
-2
.1
1
-1
0.
90
-9
.8
7
-6
.3
0
-5
.9
2
-1
0.
08
-8
.7
8
d
iff
er
en
ce
(A
d
v
-B
A
/B
S
d
eg
)
-4
.0
2
-0
.3
1
-2
.6
6
-1
.5
1
-2
.1
0
0.
69
-2
.0
9
-3
.1
2
N
o
te
:
T
h
e
sa
m
p
le
fo
r
co
lu
m
n
s
4
-8
is
ch
il
d
re
n
0
-7
y
ea
rs
o
f
a
g
e.
67
Table 2.6: Percentage with a checkup in the last 12 months by selected explanatory
variables and eligibility for children 0-18 years of age
Explanatory variable eligible not eligible difference
Race
white 67.55 64.76 2.79
black 76.26 74.34 1.92
difference (white-black) -8.71 -9.58 0.87
Hispanic origin
yes 65.16 60.57 4.59
no 72.14 67.69 4.45
difference (yes-no) -6.98 -7.12 0.14
Born in U.S.
yes 71.70 67.51 4.19
no 50.25 51.21 -0.96
difference (yes-no) 21.45 16.30 5.15
Mother’s education
no high school degree 65.80 57.43 8.37
high school degree 72.95 65.89 7.06
some college 75.90 70.37 5.53
BA/BS 71.97 70.49 1.48
advanced degree 77.55 79.38 -1.83
difference (HS-No HS deg) 7.15 8.46 -1.31
difference (some col-HS deg) 2.95 4.48 -1.53
Note: The sample is those without a source of private health insurance.
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Table 2.10: Signs of coefficients for covariates
covariate (omitted group) enrolled (OLS) eligible (OLS) eligible (2SLS)
gender (female) 0 +/0 +/0
age (youngest group) - - -
race - black (white) +/- +/- +/-/0
race - other (white) +/- +/- +/-/0
Hispanic origin - - -/0
born in U.S. + + +
family size (small size) - - -
mother’s education (low level) + + +
family income (low income) + + +
fixed effects
state Yes Yes Yes
time Yes Yes Yes
age Yes Yes Yes
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Table A.2: Summary Means - dependent variables - immunizations, for children 0-7 years
of age
Variable 1997-2003 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
health card
observations 12,932 2,216 2,107 1,813 1,882 19,83 1,578 1,353
any recorded shots
DTP 92.55 95.76 94.83 94.10 90.91 90.47 89.73 90.32
polio 89.59 95.13 92.69 91.78 86.45 86.74 85.87 85.66
varicella 27.79 10.88 16.74 24.00 30.03 35.65 40.26 45.76
MMR 80.58 84.53 83.00 81.58 77.04 79.29 78.35 79.03
HIB 85.31 88.40 85.95 85.71 81.99 83.31 85.17 86.40
up-to-date
DTP 78.28 83.70 78.08 77.77 74.82 77.67 77.59 76.90
polio 77.66 87.91 80.75 76.59 71.13 74.48 75.00 74.27
varicella 31.23 12.22 18.68 26.89 33.77 39.83 45.39 51.33
MMR 90.59 95.27 93.07 91.85 86.60 89.02 88.32 88.59
HIB 57.17 58.37 57.13 57.30 54.23 56.26 57.86 59.68
received on time
DTP 44.95 43.67 42.58 43.74 43.79 46.78 46.32 49.77
polio 53.02 55.24 53.56 51.27 50.30 53.76 52.89 54.05
varicella 17.96 5.90 9.88 14.88 18.40 23.12 27.53 32.65
MMR 63.52 62.41 62.39 62.66 62.00 63.50 64.18 69.34
HIB 30.15 29.67 29.49 28.71 28.86 29.85 31.83 34.22
parent/guardian
observations 23,558 3,651 3,332 3,245 3,439 3,407 3,313 3,171
any recorded shots
DTP 98.40 98.19 98.70 98.28 98.91 98.30 97.99 98.39
polio 96.44 97.77 97.22 96.58 96.49 96.18 95.22 95.38
varicella 47.66 33.90 36.05 41.19 47.17 54.26 60.00 63.05
MMR 96.96 96.49 96.86 96.82 97.01 97.20 97.17 97.23
HIB 90.77 89.65 90.91 91.89 90.55 89.37 90.97 92.25
up-to-date
DTP 91.59 91.14 92.39 92.20 92.63 90.92 89.98 91.85
polio 90.85 92.29 92.16 91.56 91.53 90.46 88.90 88.58
varicella 44.79 31.91 33.33 38.71 44.58 51.46 56.91 59.82
MMR 96.57 96.12 96.47 96.44 96.61 96.84 96.75 96.79
HIB 83.16 81.74 83.69 85.38 83.97 81.82 81.57 84.11
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Table A.3: Summary Means - explanatory variables, for children 0-18 years of age
Variable 97-03 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
observations 100,402 15,244 14,619 14,217 14,711 14,766 13,570 13,275
gender
male 51.39 51.17 51.54 51.17 51.75 51.43 51.40 51.30
female 48.61 48.83 48.46 48.83 48.25 48.57 48.60 48.70
age
0-6 39.21 40.26 39.46 39.31 38.97 39.08 38.87 38.58
7-12 31.00 30.45 31.36 31.25 30.72 31.08 31.01 31.11
13-17 29.79 29.29 29.18 29.44 30.31 29.84 30.12 30.31
race
white 76.66 77.99 77.55 76.82 75.90 76.55 76.46 75.37
black 14.99 15.19 15.08 14.98 14.98 14.84 14.67 15.21
other 8.35 6.81 7.37 8.20 9.11 8.60 8.86 9.42
Hispanic origin 14.92 13.65 13.74 14.51 14.82 15.35 15.81 16.50
born in U.S. 95.46 95.57 95.75 96.02 94.90 95.00 95.48 95.53
family size
two 8.34 8.53 8.66 7.84 8.04 8.49 8.17 8.66
three 30.42 30.48 31.16 30.86 30.19 30.17 30.16 29.93
four 35.67 35.56 35.57 36.05 35.72 35.50 36.16 35.14
five 16.44 16.53 15.89 16.27 16.56 16.66 16.37 16.77
> five 9.13 8.91 8.72 8.98 9.49 9.18 9.13 9.50
mother’s education
no high school degree 14.67 15.80 14.29 14.35 15.12 14.35 14.15 14.71
high school degree 29.11 30.62 30.21 29.67 29.39 28.42 28.40 27.17
some college 31.75 31.43 31.65 32.05 31.06 31.94 32.40 31.70
BA/BS 17.34 15.27 16.80 17.34 17.34 18.03 17.52 18.91
advanced degree 7.13 6.87 7.06 6.59 7.09 7.26 7.53 7.50
family income
$0-20,000 21.70 24.74 22.45 20.95 20.90 20.54 21.29 21.08
$20,000-$35,000 18.75 19.23 19.05 18.36 18.97 17.84 18.41 19.41
$35,000-$50,000 16.79 18.11 17.27 17.23 16.55 17.21 15.98 15.23
$50,000-$75,000 20.47 20.35 20.63 21.01 21.47 20.17 20.11 19.57
over $75,000 22.29 17.58 20.60 22.46 22.11 24.23 24.21 24.71
reported health status
excellent 53.07 52.63 53.77 53.70 52.25 53.47 53.22 52.44
very good 28.65 28.17 28.35 28.62 29.12 28.60 28.63 29.13
good 16.29 16.96 15.88 15.90 16.75 15.98 15.97 16.54
fair 1.73 1.89 1.73 1.62 1.61 1.71 1.90 1.68
poor 0.26 0.35 0.27 0.16 0.27 0.24 0.27 0.22
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